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MOBILIZING IMMIGRANTS
Jayanth K. Krishnan*
INTRODUCTION
Still gripped by emotions of despair, frustration, and loss, many
Americans continue to struggle with how best to move on with their lives
following the terrorist attacks that left over three thousand people dead on
September 11, 2001. The anthrax outburst that ensued after the 9-11 attacks
and the 2002 sniper murders in the Washington D.C. area further put on
edge a nation racked with fear and angst. Understandably, feelings of anger
and pain remain present among those most affected by these tragedies. But
sadly some individuals have exploited these events to express their long-
held prejudices. Immigrant communities have been primary targets of such
hostilities. Overt retributive acts have been committed, most notably in the
form of violence against Arabs, Indians, Pakistanis, and other ethnic and
religious minorities.' The lives of immigrants, however, have changed in
the post 9-11 era not just because of violent acts by criminals. In the face of
public pressure to resolve the perceived problems of immigration, politi-
cians and members of law enforcement have initiated a wave of "reforms,"
resulting in the curtailment of both illegal and legal immigrants' rights.
Courageously, social activists, scholars, students, and others have pro-
tested such mistreatment of immigrants. Given the political climate, this
coalition has encountered incredible challenges in the pursuit of their cause,
especially when defending illegal immigrants. Partly for this reason per-
haps, these advocates mainly have sought to ensure that illegal immigrants
* Assistant Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, MN. J.D. Ohio State
University; Ph.D. University of Wisconsin-Madison. For their much needed and much appreciated
feedback on earlier versions of this article, the author expresses gratitude to Hiroshi Motomura, Kevin
Johnson, and Eric Janus. The author also thanks Austin Sarat, Stuart Scheingold, Raleigh Levine, and
Russ Pannier for their insights.
I Several organizations have set up websites detailing the violence ethnic and religious communi-
ties in the U.S. have faced since the 9-11 attacks. For a sample of sites, see the Anti-Defamation
League, at http://www.adl.org/terrorismamerica/adlresponds.asp (last visited Apr. 18, 2004); Human
Rights Watch, at http://www.hrw.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2004); Amnesty International, at
http://www.amnestyusa.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2004); Arab-American Institute, at
http://www.aaiusa.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2004); and National Network for Immigrant and Refugee
Rights, at http://www.nnirr.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2004). This point was also made recently by Tho-
mas Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference, and the Construction of Race Be-
fore and After September 11, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 1, 2 (2002).
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are treated humanely and with due process. But the defense of legal immi-
grants, particularly lawful permanent residents, has been much more vigor-
ous. Social justice advocates express outrage that immigrants who have
lawfully entered the United States, paid their taxes, contributed to the econ-
omy, and lived in a law-abiding manner, are now being discriminated
against just because they are non-citizens. In his 2002 Stanford Law Review
article, Professor David Cole describes what he calls the "double standard"2
of treatment between citizens and lawful permanent residents. Cole cri-
tiques the various methods that the Bush administration has employed to
accentuate this distinction, such as subjecting certain permanent residents to
secretive preventive detentions and military tribunals. For Cole, one main
reason that legal immigrants have so suffered in the post 9-11 period is
because they "have no vote, and thus no direct voice in the democratic
process[. As such,] they are a particularly vulnerable minority."3
This argument that lawful permanent residents are politically disad-
vantaged because they lack the right to vote has a history of support. As I
detail in Section II, for years Professors Jamin Raskin, Gerald Neuman, and
Gerald Rosberg have each contended that lawful permanent residents
should be granted the right to vote.4 They argue democratic theory man-
dates that people who live like citizens be granted the same rights as citi-
zens-including the right to vote. For these scholars, the right to vote is an
important way to extract accountability from politicians who otherwise
have been able to implement detrimental policies affecting immigrant inter-
ests.
At the end of Section II I make it clear that I also support extending
voting rights to lawful permanent residents. But assuming for a moment
that suffrage is granted to this community-which given the current politi-
cal climate seems rather unlikely-then what? It would be disingenuous to
suggest that Professors Cole, Raskin, Neuman, and Rosberg believe that
providing voting rights to permanent residents will necessarily lead to these
immigrants heading to the ballot box. These scholars, moreover, well know
that even if voting rights were to be granted to permanent residents, there
are no guarantees that this group's current predicament would change
much. Presumably permanent residents, even with the right to vote, would
run up against challenges presented by interests that outnumber them;
2 David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 957 (2002).
3 Id.
4 See GERALD NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND
FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996); Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitu-
tional and Theoretical Meanings ofAlien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391 (1993) [hereinafter Raskin,
Legal Aliens]; Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH.
L. REv. 1092 (1977). See also Hiroshi Motomura, Review Essay, Whose Immigration Law? Citizens,
Aliens, and the Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1567 (1997).
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thereby facing the same types of political disadvantages encountered by
other minority blocs.
For this reason, Section III builds upon the important contributions
made by the immigrant suffrage advocates by asserting that although grant-
ing voting rights may be a good starting point, permanent residents would
also be greatly benefited by having legally entrepreneurial 5 lawyers in-
volved in their movement. These lawyers, as I shall explain, can be both
instrumentally and normatively valuable for permanent resident communi-
ties.
No doubt, many who hear this claim will bristle at this suggestion. The
criticism from skeptical lawyers has a long history. The common refrain is
that when lawyers serve as leaders of emerging movements they too fre-
quently obstruct the issues they set out to champion.6 These types of social
movement lawyers tend to focus their energies on improving the move-
ment's position in society primarily through litigation. Because these law-
yers are preoccupied with self-aggrandizement, they construct their strate-
gies to fit with their own expertise.7 Such elites inevitably take the move-
ment hostage. 8 They frame issues, structure the discourse, and organize
campaigns mainly through legal means, and consequently they divert im-
5 This idea of legal entrepreneurship has appeared previously in the legal literature. Among the
most frequent users of this term is Professor John Coffee. Coffee has used this term to characterize
those skilled lawyers who tend to think of risk-taking in terms of costs and benefits. For a sample of
works in which Coffee has employed this term, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: A Gen-
tle Critique of the Third Circuit Task Force Report, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 805, 810 (2001); John C. Coffee,
Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000); John C. Coffee, Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on
Reform, 62 IND. L. J. 625 (1986-1987); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litiga-
tion: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987); and
John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty
Hunter is not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215 (1983). Others too have employed the term "legal entrepre-
neur" in their works. See, e.g., M.H. Hoeflich, John Livingston: Legal Entrepreneur, AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. (forthcoming 2004); Donald D. Landon, Lassale Street and Main Street: The Role of Context in
Structuring Law Practice, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 213 (1988); Margaret A. Little, A Most Dangerous
Indiscretion: The Legal, Economic, and Political Legacy of the Governments' Tobacco Litigation, 33
CONN. L. REV. 1143 (2001); Jonathan B. Wiener, Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal
Transplants and the Evolution of Global Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1295 (2000).
6 For a summary of this critique, see generally MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK (1994)
[hereinafter MCCANN, RIGHTS]; and Michael McCann & Helen Silverstein, Rethinking Law's "Allure-
ment": A Relational Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United States, in CAUSE LAWYERING:
POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 261 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Schie-
ingold eds., 1998).
7 See generally JOEL HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF
LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1978); JACK KATZ, POOR PEOPLE'S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION
(1982); SUSAN M. OLSON, CLIENTS AND LAWYERS: SECURING THE RIGHTS OF DISABLED PERSONS
(1984).
8 See TIMOTHY O'NEILL, BAKKE AND THE POLITICS OF EQUALITY (1985).
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portant resources away from tactics that have more significant long-term
effects. 9 And perhaps most egregiously, lawyers have the hubris to believe
they are critical to a movement's success, as they routinely ignore the role
that other political and policy experts can play.
As I will explain, I recognize that lawyers are not the only leaders who
can be effective in directing a social movement. A great deal of literature
shows this to be the case. 0 But in order to challenge these skeptics' claims,
I specifically focus on the important role lawyers can play in immigrant
communities. The argument I make seeks to add another layer of evidence
to the ever-growing body of scholarship detailing the multi-dimensionality
of lawyers. For example, assuming permanent residents became enfran-
chised, lawyers could make their clients and constituents aware of these
new rights as well as use the power of rhetoric and persuasion to demon-
strate how and why the right to vote is so important. But even without the
right to vote, lawyers can (and do) still empower immigrants by combining
legal strategies with mass-based tactics and by developing important coali-
tion partners in order to improve the present political status of immigrants.
As I will discuss, lawyers often have been able to create a legal and politi-
cal consciousness that has lead to immigrants participating in the political
process." Lawyers within immigrant communities thus do not have to op-
erate just off of "personal ... beliefs and abstract programmatic commit-
ments." ' 2 They can be versatile actors depending upon their professional
and political background; their role within the immigrant community; the
organizational structure of the immigrant movement; and the overarching
political and societal attitudes towards immigrant rights.' 3
9 See McCann & Silverstein, supra note 6, at 262-64. See generally GERALD ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE
POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1974) [hereinafter
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS]; Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 363
(1984) [herinafter Tushnet, An Essay].
10 See, e.g., COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES,
MOBILIZING STRUCTURES AND CULTURAL FRAMINGS (Doug McAdam et al. eds., 1996); SIDNEY
TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND POLITICS (1994);
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AN ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY: COLLECTED ESSAYS (Mayer N. Zald & John
D. McCarthy eds., 1987); THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT SOCIETY: CONTENTIOUS POLITICS FOR A NEW
CENTURY (David Meyer & Sydney Tarrow. eds., 1998).
11 For a general discussion of this idea of legal and political consciousness, see McCann &
Silverstein, supra note 6. See also Robert Kidder & Setsuo Miyazawa, Long-Term Strategies in Japa-
nese Environmental Litigation, 18 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 4 (1993).
12 See McCann & Silverstein, supra note 6, at 262. For commentary on the behavioral nuances
that movement leaders should, can, and do display, see Kevin R. Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigra-
tion: Challenges for the Latino Community in the Twenty-First Century, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 42, 43-44
(1995) [hereinafter Johnson, Civil Rights].
13 These variables are drawn from McCann & Silverstein, supra note 6.
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In other words, lawyers can perform an educative function; they can
teach and motivate the rank and file about the importance of voting-
something that the right itself of course cannot do. And in the absence of
immigrant suffrage, lawyers still can politicize this disenfranchised group,
making every effort to ensure that the rights immigrants do possess remain
intact. One question that emerges from this discussion is under what condi-
tions will lawyers seeking to assist immigrant communities be encouraged
to engage in such activities. In the final section of this article, I offer a pre-
liminary set of suggestions addressing this issue. For those of us interested
in protecting the rights of immigrants at this crucial juncture in American
history, the hope is that the lessons from this study can move us in this di-
rection. 4
I. EMPOWERING PERMANENT RESIDENTS THROUGH SUFFRAGE: A
SURVEY OF THE EXISTING LITERATURE
A. The Arguments Against Non-Citizen Suffrage
As stated above, the notion that permanent residents should have the
right to vote has been on the agenda of scholars for some time. In a mo-
ment, I shall explain the arguments in favor of this position, and then build
upon this valuable literature by discussing (a) how with the right to vote,
immigrants seeking to mobilize can be greatly assisted by the efforts of
lawyers; and (b) how even absent the right to vote, lawyers can remain
critical in helping immigrants fight for their rights.
But before proceeding to this discussion, there is the question of
whether non-citizens should even be able to vote in the first place. To
many, the immediate answer to this question seems straightforward-no.
After all, non-citizens are just that; they are not full members of the politi-
cal community and thus should have no expectation or right to participate
in the voting process. 5 Proponents of this argument point to the Constitu-
14 Note, my focus on the ability of lawyers to help both enfranchised and disenfranchised immi-
grants may lead some to wonder how important suffrage is at all in my analysis. As I shall explain, if
permanent residents were granted the right to vote, immigrant-rights lawyers would be armed with one
more important option that they could draw on to mobilize their constituents as a means of influencing
public policy. Without this right, the lawyer's influence on particularly elected policymakers diminishes
some, although as we will see, not completely.
15 But there are those who contend that non-citizens should be able to participate in other ways.
See Bruce D. Brown, Alien-Donors: The Participation of Non-Citizens in the U.S. Campaign Finance
System, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 503 (1997) (arguing that aliens should remain disenfranchised,
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tion as support for the position that only citizens may vote. One observer
interprets the 26th Amendment as providing "that U.S. citizens' right to
vote cannot be abridged under specified circumstances, implying that only
citizens have the right to vote." 16 Some years back the Supreme Court reit-
erated this same position. In upholding a New York statute excluding non-
citizens from serving on the police force, the Court in Foley v. Connolie
went on to say that non-citizens may also be denied suffrage. 7 In Cabell v.
Chavez-Salido, the Court noted that distinguishing between people who are
non-citizens and who are citizens is vital to the integrity of the democratic
process. 8 And in the famous decision of Sugarman v. Dougall, the Court
accepted as "clear evidence that [the Fortieth] Congress not only knew that
as a matter of local practice aliens had not been granted the right to vote,
but that under the [Fourteenth] amendment they did not receive a constitu-
tional right of suffrage or a constitutional right to participate in the political
process of state government."' 9
There are other reasons why many people oppose non-citizen suffrage.
There is the issue of loyalty. How can we permit individuals with presumed
allegiances to other countries to participate in our political process-
especially if the country from which the individual immigrates is hostile to
the United States?2" Imagine today allowing lawful permanent residents
from Afghanistan or Iraq, who may be sympathetic to the former Taliban
regime or Saddam Hussein, to vote in American elections. The right to vote
is one of the most precious and awesome responsibilities that members
within a democratic community possess. Although voter turnout in the
United States is criticized for being low, and in most cases an individual's
lone vote makes little difference in the ultimate outcome,2' suffrage has
enormous symbolic value and is recognized as the centerpiece for any de-
although they should be allowed to participate, financially, in the political process). See also Jessica S.
Horrocks, Campaigns, Contributions and Citizenship: The First Amendment Right of Resident Aliens to
Finance Federal Elections, 38 B.C. L. REV. 771 (1997).
16 See Karin Schemer-Kim, The Role of the Oath of Renunciation in Current U.S. Nationality
Policy-To Enforce, to Omit, or Maybe to Change, 88 GEO. L.J. 329, 337 n.50 (2000).
17 Foley v. Connolie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978).
18 Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1982).
19 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649 n.13 (1973).
20 This position has recently been summarized by Elise Brozovich, Prospects for Democratic
Change: Non-Citizen Suffrage in America, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L & POL'Y 403 (2002). See also Brown,
supra note 15.
21 For a discussion of this point, see DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, THE PATHOLOGIES OF
RATIONAL CHOICE (1994). For a rebuttal, please consult JEFFREY FRIEDMAN, THE RATIONAL CHOICE
CONTROVERSY: ECONOMIC MODELS OF POLITICS RECONSIDERED (1996). Although given the 2000
election between George W. Bush and Al Gore, individual votes may count for more than previously
thought.
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mocratic state. 22 The idea that this valuable right could be exercised by
"outsiders" is beyond comprehension for those who oppose immigrant suf-
frage.
One famous observer who agrees that community-membership entitles
individuals to certain privileges and rights over non-members is Michael
Walzer. 23 Because of the importance Walzer places on the right to self-
determination, he believes that communities are justified to exclude outsid-
ers from reaping the benefits enjoyed by members. Communities share a
common culture, set of norms, and ideas about justice and legal rights; con-
sequently they should be able to decide who can participate in the political
process and who cannot. Citizenship-the one certain way to delineate
members from non-members-gives a community its sense of identity as a
nation. If non-citizens are permitted to engage in politics in the same way
as citizens, then the sovereignty and distinctiveness of that nation are seri-
ously undermined. 24 Thus, the arguments against giving lawful permanent
residents the right to vote resonate with many people. But as we shall next
see, over the past three decades opponents have countered with their own
set of serious rebuttals.
B. Why Immigrant Suffrage is Important-and Constitutional
While a number of observers oppose granting suffrage to immigrants,
there are active supporters who favor extending this right. Pro-alien suf-
frage advocates contend that excluding permanent residents from voting
hurts the democratic process and keeps out a significant community whose
rights are otherwise ignored.25 In drawing on the work of Alex Aleinikoff,
David Martin, and Hiroshi Motomura,26 Elise Brozovich contends that two
22 The literature that discusses this symbolic importance is vast. I shall return to this issue later in
the article. However, for now, see: Stephen Knack, Civic Norms, Social Sanctions and Voter Turnout, 4
RATIONALITY & Soc. 133 (1992); Jan E. Leighley & Jonathan Nagler, Individual and Systematic Influ-
ences on Turnout: Who Votes? 54 J. POL. 718 (1992); Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996); and Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in
Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765 (1998).
23 See generally MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983).
24 It is important to note that Walzer does believe that it is immoral to bring non-members into the
community but not provide them with the same rights as those already living there. This point relates to
his famous "guest workers" argument; in other words, for Walzer, the options are either to bring outsid-
ers in and treat them equally or not to bring them in at all. See generally id. For one scholar who has
evaluated this aspect of Walzer's work, see Jospeh Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open
Borders, 49 REv. POL. 251 (1987).
25 See, e.g., Brozovich, supra note 20, at 405-406.
26 See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND
POLICY 571-85 (5th ed., 2003).
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alternative arguments have been set forth by scholars who support non-
citizen suffrage. 7 One view is that the Constitution passively permits legis-
latures to grant permanent residents the right to vote; the other claims that
non-citizen voting can be justified under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.2" As support for this constructed dichotomy, Pro-
fessor Jamin Raskin is viewed as the key representative for the former,
while Professor Gerald Rosberg is seen as the proponent of the latter.
First, Raskin, in arguing that the Constitution allows states to extend
suffrage to lawful permanent residents, uses a historically-oriented method-
ology as the basis for his position.29 Raskin rejects the notion that providing
lawful permanent residents with the right to vote at the national and state
levels would serve as a political aberration. He shows that at various peri-
ods in American history non-citizens had the right to vote. As he notes:
"From the moment the Declaration of Independence was signed (including
by several aliens), alien enfranchisement seemed to many states, such as
Vermont and Virginia, the logical thing to do ... The key suffrage qualifi-
cations in the states centered on property ownership, race and gender, not
on national citizenship."3 °
In fact, as early as 1809 a Pennsylvania court held that so long as one
lived in an American jurisdiction, owned property, and paid taxes, the prin-
ciples of natural justice mandated that the individual be able to participate
in the political process through voting.3'
In the period preceding the Civil War, Northern states, such as Michi-
gan, also extended the right to vote to non-citizens. Although Southern
states rejected this practice because they feared non-citizens would oppose
the institution of slavery, Northern states saw enfranchising non-citizens as
a "matter of basic justice."3 2 Following the Civil War, non-citizen suffrage
gained momentum in various states, eventually including those in the south
and in the west.33 Kiyoko Knapp notes that during this time "the laws and
constitutions of at least twenty-two states and territories granted aliens the
right to vote. 34 But, according to Raskin, at the dawn of the twentieth cen-
27 ld; Brozovich, supra note 20, at 404-05.
28 Id.
29 See Raskin, Legal Aliens, supra note 4.
30 Jamin B. Raskin, Time to Give Aliens the Right to Vote (Again), 256 THE NATION, Apr. 1993, at
433 [hereinafter Raskin, Time to Give].
31 Id. See also Brozovich, supra note 20, at 407; Raskin, Legal Aliens, supra note 4, at 1403. Both
articles also cite the case of Stewart v. Foster, 2 Binn. 110 (Pa. 1809).
32 See Raskin, Time to Give, supra note 30, at 433. See also Raskin, Legal Aliens, supra note 4, at
1408.
33 See Raskin, Time to Give, supra note 30, at 433.
34 Kiyoko Kamio Knapp, The Rhetoric of Exclusion: The Art of Drawing the Line Between Aliens
and Citizens, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 401,405 (1996).
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tury the movement for non-citizen suffrage waned, as newer, incoming
immigrants were racially, linguistically, and ethnically different from their
predecessors. 35 Hostility towards immigrants only deepened with the emer-
gence of the First World War, and by 1926 Arkansas became the final state
to abandon providing non-citizens with the right to vote.36 Only a few local
jurisdictions, such as Takoma Park, Maryland and Cambridge, Massachu-
setts, continue to permit non-citizen suffrage.37
To some observers, the cessation of immigrant suffrage began the
formal exclusion of permanent residents from American politics. Gerald
Neuman, one scholar who too believes that the Constitution leaves room
for state legislatures to grant non-citizen suffrage, has commented that con-
ceptions of who may vote should not necessarily be fixed to the privileged
class of citizens, or what he calls "core electorates. 38 Is it not strange,
Neuman ponders, that American citizens who opt to reside in a foreign
country are allowed to continue voting in U.S. elections, while lawful per-
manent residents who pay taxes, contribute to the local economy, and re-
side within a U.S. jurisdiction are not? Is it simply because U.S. citizens
possess this (faux) construct that we call "citizenship? ' 39 For Neuman,
there is no strong constitutional justification for marginalizing immigrants
who otherwise appear the same as citizens.4
This point about permanent residents and citizens sharing many im-
portant characteristics prompts Elise Brozovich to assert that "non-citizen
suffrage is required by the equal protection clause of the 14th amend-
ment."'" Gerald Rosberg similarly for years has argued that any attempt by
Congress or a state legislature to curtail the voting rights of permanent resi-
35 Brozovich, supra note 20, at 410; Raskin, Legal Aliens, supra note 4, at 1397. See also Martha
I. Morgan & Neal Hutchens, The Tangled Web ofAlabama's Equality Doctrine After Melof: Historical
Reflections on Equal Protection and the Alabama Constitution, 53 ALA. L. REV. 135 (2001) (noting that
in Alabama in 1901, voting rights for aliens began to be scaled back as delegates to the state constitu-
tional convention started to require that aliens who wished to vote had to promise to become citizens as
soon as they were eligible).
36 Raskin, Time to Give, supra note 30; Knapp, supra note 34, at 406. See also DAVID WEISS-
BRODT, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 429-30 (4 ' ed., 1998).
37 See Brozovich, supra note 20, at 442-45; Raskin, Legal Aliens, supra note 4, at 1462-65; Peter
H. Schuck, Immigration at the Turn of the New Century, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (2001); Vir-
ginia Harper-Ho, Noncitizen Voting Rights: The History, the Law and Current Prospects for Change, 18
LAW & INEQ. 271 (2000).
38 NEUMAN, supra note 4, at 142.
39 Id. at 143. See also Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition
187, and the Structure of the Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425 (1995).
40 Id. For a comparative discussion of this subject, see Gerald L. Neuman, " We Are the People
Alien Suffrage in German andAmerican Perspective, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L.259 (1992).
41 See Brozovich, supra note 20, at 413-14.
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dents must be subjected to the strictest scrutiny by the courts. 4 2 For Ros-
berg, alienage is almost on par with race as being a suspect classification,43
and he questions whether there is even a compelling explanation for deny-
ing permanent residents suffrage. As he states:
I do not believe that it is possible to articulate an explanation for this assumption without
moving the discussion to a level of extremely high abstraction and without putting a great
deal of weight on symbolic values. To sustain the disenfranchisement of aliens on the
strength of that kind of reasoning would be fundamentally inconsistent, it seems to me, with
our ordinary approach in determining which state interests are compelling. But I am confi-
dent at least that the validity of laws denying aliens the vote is by no means self-evident. It is
surely not enough to tip one's hat at the state interest in having knowledgeable and loyal vot-
ers and let it go at that."
Richard Briffault, in a recent article, has echoed many of Rosberg's
arguments. Politically, socially, and economically, permanent residents can
be and are similar to their citizen counterparts.45 It, therefore, seems logical
that courts should apply the standard of strict scrutiny to restrictions on
non-citizen suffrage. 46 But as Briffault points out, different rulings over the
past two decades indicate that courts have been unwilling to treat non-
citizens in a similar manner to citizens. I mentioned earlier the Sugarman
case where the Supreme Court discussed how at the heart of any political
community is the presence of members who are defined in terms of their
mutual citizenship.47 For the Sugarman Court, it seemed antithetical to
Congress's intent that non-members, such as permanent residents, might be
able to participate in the election process.48 Seeming to follow this lead, in
Skafte v. Rorex, the Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal of a Colorado
Supreme Court ruling, which held that the legislature is only required to
42 Rosberg, supra note 4. See also Gerald Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory
Treatment by the National Government, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 275 (1978).
43 Id. For a presentation of this argument see Brozovich, supra note 20, at 405. See also Valerie L.
Barth, Anti-Immigrant Backlash and the Role of the Judiciary: A Proposal for Heightened Review of
Federal Laws Affecting Immigrants, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 105 (1997).
44 Rosberg, supra note 4, at 1135. This famous passage has been quoted also in ALEINIKOFF ET.
AL., supra note 26, at 583.
45 Richard Briffault, Legal History: The Contested Right to Vote, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1506, 1526
(2002) (noting that "[like other residents, aliens are subject to state and local regulation, taxation, and
law enforcement, and depend on states and localities for basic public services, including public safety,
sanitation, and education."). See also Jeffrey A. Roy, Carolene Products: A Game Theoretic Approach,
BYU L. REv. 53, 93 (2002) (noting that "alienage has been recognized as a suspect classification,
although the Court has applied strict scrutiny more deferentially in cases involving aliens than in those
involving race.").
46 See Briffault, supra note 45.
47 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
48 Id. at 649 n.13.
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give a rational explanation for why non-citizens cannot vote in school
board elections.49 The Colorado court did not accept the idea that perma-
nent residents-despite their presence and involvement within the local
polity-constituted a part of the political community. °
But even with these adverse decisions, the call for non-citizen suf-
frage, at least among academics, has not dissipated. As stated earlier, David
Cole's 2002 article raises great concern over the lack of access non-citizens
have to the political process. In a very methodical manner, Cole makes an
impassioned plea to both politicians and the public to re-examine the harsh
set of conditions non-citizens have endured in the post 9-11 era. For Cole,
"the most troubling feature of the government's response to the attacks of
September 11 has been its campaign of mass preventive detention."'" That
nearly two thousand non-citizens have been held in secret, in the absence of
legal representation, and without any official charges leveled against them
highlights the government's lack of respect for individual liberties and civil
rights.52 As important, though, Cole attributes the mistreatment of non-
citizens since the 9-Il attacks on the fact that these individuals have no real
voice in American politics.53 Non-citizens lack political muscle, and as a
result, few politicians are willing to expend their precious political capital
on a community that yields so little back in terms of votes.
5 4
But as Cole notes, in addition to the secretive detentions, there have
been other examples of non-citizens suffering since 9-11. For example,
with Congressional passage of the USA PATRIOT Act,55 legal non-citizens
found to have even the most tangential association with suspicious organi-
zations are now subject to deportation or imprisonment.5 6 The Act also
49 See Skafte v. Rorex, 553 P.2d 830, 832 (Colo. 1976), appeal dismissed, 430 U.S. 961 (1977).
For two astute discussions of this case, see ALIENIKOFF ET AL., supra note 26, at 453-534 (detailing
admissions procedures) and Brozovich, supra note 20, at 424-25.
50 Skafte, 553 P.2d at 832.
51 See Cole, supra note 2, at 960.
52 Id. at 960-66.
53 Id. at 959 (noting that "the true test of justice in a democratic society is not how it treats those
with a political voice, but how it treats those who have no voice in the democratic process.").
54 Id. at 981. See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Faith: America Without Judicial Review, 98
MICH. L. REV. 1416 (2000) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
COURTS (1999)) (noting "that the political process has no incentive to protect aliens from discrimina-
tion, but it has great incentive to impose burdens on aliens who cannot vote and thereby to benefit the
citizens who do"); Kevin Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political Power ofNonciti-
zens, andImmigration Law and Enforcement, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1139, 1153 (1993).
55 Uniting and Strengthening of America by Providing Appropriate Tools to Intercept and Ob-
struct Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified under various titles of the
U.S.C.).
56 See Cole, supra note 2, at 966-69. There is currently an initiative being proposed by Attorney
General John Ashcroft that would expand even further the provisions I shall be discussing in the present
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permits the INS to exclude those seeking admission into the United States
on the basis of the applicant's ideology. 57 This new legislation also gives
law enforcement greater latitude in conducting secret searches without
probable cause, including the allowance of more intrusive wiretapping. 8 In
addition, data shows that ethnic profiling by the Justice Department of Ar-
abs and South Asian immigrants has dramatically increased since 9-11.
51
And military tribunals have been established for the purposes of trying only
non-citizens, exemplifying the point that the rights of these individuals
have been severely curtailed in this era of heightened security.6"
For Cole, because they are a "group that is subject to government
regulation but denied a right to vote, aliens are without a meaningful voice
in the political bargains struck by our representative system. ' '61 This mes-
sage has resonated with other scholars.62 Tamra Boyd and Victor Romero
each have intimated that one main reason immigrant groups have been un-
able to mobilize to pursue policy goals is because they have been politically
inhibited by their lack of voting power.63 Romero, in particular, has com-
legislation. Reports indicate that among "perhaps the most troubling section[s] would [be to] strip U.S.
citizenship from anyone who gives 'material support' to any group that the Attorney General designates
as a terrorist organization." Jack M. Balkin, A Dreadful Act 11, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2003, at B23.
Because little is known about this initiative, I shall, for now, only consider the USA Patriot Act itself.
For an investigative journalistic piece that has uncovered what else the Patriot II initiative contains, see:
CHARLES LEWIS & ADAM MAYLE, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, JUSTICE DEPT. DRAFTS
SWEEPING EXPANSION OF ANTI-TERRORISM ACT: CENTER PUBLISHES SECRET DRAFT OF 'PATRIOT I'
LEGISLATION 2003, available at http://publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/report.asp?ReportD=502 (Feb. 7,
2003). For important Supreme Court cases that have discussed denationalization, see Vance v. Terrazas,
444 U.S. 252 (1980); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
57 As Cole notes, although the Supreme Court has stated that aliens living outside of the U.S. have
fewer constitutional protections than those residing within, normatively he believes that the power of
the First Amendment is reduced by resorting to such practices. See Cole, supra note 2, at 969-71. For a
related discussion, see Kevin R. Johnson, Aliens and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal
Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 263 (1996-97).
58 See Cole, supra note 2, at 972-74. See also Joo, supra note 1, at 37-38.
59 See Cole, supra note 2, at 974-77.
60 Id. at 974-78.
61 Id. at 981. In this section of his argument, Cole contends that viewing the Bill of Rights as
human rights further supports the notion that aliens should not artificially be separated from citizens,
simply because of their immigrant status. See also Connie Chang, Immigrants Under the New Welfare
Law: A Call for Uniformity, A Call for Justice, 45 UCLA L. REV. 205 (1997).
62 Many scholars who support alien suffrage have been either directly or indirectly influenced by
the classic works of Jeremy Bentham. For a monumental reading in this area, see THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 3 (John Bowring ed., 1962).
63 Tamra M. Boyd, Keeping the Constitution's Promise: An Argument for Greater Judicial Scru-
tiny of Federal Alien Classification, 54 STAN. L. REV. 319, 343 (2001) (noting that, "since resident
aliens cannot vote, they are unlike other minorities, who can theoretically pool their voting strength,
build coalitions, and otherwise utilize the political process to protect themselves"). For a related discus-
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mented that if non-citizens had the right to vote, deportation hearings might
be procedurally fairer and immigration authorities in these settings would
likely act in a more tempered manner. 6 April Chung similarly believes that
providing immigrants such as Asians and Latinos with the right to vote
would result in their interests being better represented.65 And along these
same lines, Kiyoko Knapp states that non-citizen suffrage would result in
making legislators more responsive to immigrants.66 As Knapp and others
contend, unless legislators are provided with such electoral incentives, the
needs of non-citizens will continue to remain of peripheral concern.67
Many legal observers thus believe that non-citizens, particularly per-
manent residents, deserve the right to vote in American elections. I share
this view, and in the next section, Section III, I seek to build upon this lit-
erature by advancing the discussion one step further. Specifically, what if
tomorrow permanent residents were granted the right to vote-then what?
As I explain, a series of organizational hurdles exist that frequently impair
members of a group from collectively employing their rights, such as exer-
cising their right to vote. One way to overcome these barriers, as I will dis-
cuss, is to have leaders, namely lawyers, present who can help to translate
this type of right into an actual political tool. Indeed, I will specifically ex-
plain how lawyers can use their skills to get newly enfranchised individuals
to the ballot box.
Yet to many observers, the idea that permanent residents might receive
suffrage rights anytime soon, especially after 9-11, is so unlikely that focus-
ing on enfranchising immigrants and then mobilizing them to the ballot box
amounts to more of a theoretical discussion than practical reality. Further-
more, for many of these "realists," involving lawyers in a movement where
they have no specific charge, such as mobilizing people to vote, will inevi-
tably lead that movement towards adopting tactics that advance the law-
yers' own interests rather than the interests of the majority of community
members. As I will show in Section IV, however, this view is off the mark;
sion, see Victor C. Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied: Rethinking Equal Protection Review of
Federal Alienage Classification After Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 76 OR. L. REV. 425, 450 (1997).
64 For a detailed discussion of this argument, see Victor C. Romero, Expanding the Circle of
Membership by Reconstructing the "Alien ": Lessons from Social Psychology and the "Promise En-
forcement" Cases, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (1998).
65 April Chung, Noncitizen Voting Rights and the Alternatives: A Path Toward Greater Asia
Pacific American and Latino Political Participation, 4 ASIAN. PAC. AM. L.J. 163 (1996).
66 Kiyoko Kamia Knapp, Disdain of Alien Lawyers: History of Exclusion, 7 SETON HALL CONST.
L.J. 103 (1996).
67 Id. See also Richard Briffault, Bush v. Gore as an Equal Protection Case, 29 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 325, 359-60 (2001); Harper-Ho, supra note 37, at 316.
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even if permanent residents remain disenfranchised, lawyers can work in
diverse ways to ensure that the rights of their constituents are not ignored.
II. WHAT HAPPENS ONCE PERMANENT RESIDENTS ACQUIRE THE RIGHT
TO VOTE?
A. Considering the Various Constraints
As those who write on immigrant suffrage know, a right to vote on
paper is not self-enforcing--extending suffrage to a marginalized group
without giving members effective means to employ this right is unlikely to
yield much in the way of substantive political action.68 One needs only to
examine the era following the Civil War to illustrate this point. Studies
have noted that while African Americans gained new constitutional rights
after 1865, they were unable to exercise these rights because of various
social and political hurdles that existed.69 Similarly, literature on the
American women's movement shows that the passage of the Nineteenth
Amendment in 1920, which enfranchised women, did not automatically
result in massive numbers of women heading to the ballot box. As empiri-
cal studies indicate, it was not until some four to five decades later that the
women's movement became a widespread, grassroots politicized force
within the American electorate. 70
68 See Stephen H. Legomsky, Why Citizenship?, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 279 (1994). Legomsky investi-
gates the importance of classifying people on the basis of who is a citizen and who is not. He suggests
that the manner in which the U.S. government decides who may become a citizen needs serious recon-
sideration. Id. As he explains, oftentimes one important factor for immigration officials in determining
who may naturalize turns on whether the individual is likely to participate in the electoral process. Id. at
286. However, similar to my contention that just providing someone with a right does not necessarily
mean that it will be used, Legomsky remarks that a positive correlation should not be assumed between
granting one citizenship and the level of political participation that that person may exert. Id. at 287-88.
Moreover, as Peter Spiro has found, in some cases those who lack citizenship may even "enjoy power-
ful champions [at the governmental level] in the form of public interest lobbies and, more notably,
foreign governments, corporations, and consumers." See Peter Spiro, Lady Liberty's Doorstep: Status
and Implications ofAmerican Immigration Law, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1628 (1997).
69 One of the most glaring examples highlighting this includes the Jim Crow laws that were pre-
sent during this time. For a selected set of readings, consult: WILLIAM HENRY CHAFEE, REMEMBERING
JIM CROW: AFRICAN AMERICANS TELL ABOUT LIFE IN THE SEGREGATED SOUTH (2001); EARL
CONRAD, JIM CROW AMERICA (1947); JESSE W. DEES, JIM CROW (1951); PETER IRONS, JIM CROW'S
CHILDREN: THE BROKEN PROMISES OF THE BROWN DECISION (2002); JAMES PATTERSON, BROWN V.
BOARD OFEDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY (2001).
70 For a selected set of important readings on this issue, see: KAREN BECKWITH, AMERICAN
WOMEN AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (1986); SARA EVANS, BORN FOR LIBERTY (1997); VIVIAN
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If the right to vote on paper does not always translate into immediate
political mobilization, this then begs the question, why not? Mancur Ol-
son's landmark study, The Logic of Collective Action, helps to shed light on
this issue.7 According to Olson, even when individuals possess rights,
there are still hurdles that must be overcome before these rights are en-
joyed. The task of organizing and mobilizing large numbers of people who
share a common goal but also possess diverse interests can be a great chal-
lenge.72 One reason is that the benefits being sought by such movements are
frequently collective in nature. Thus, those who contemplate joining a large
movement might think twice about doing so, especially if one believes that
he/she may still reap the collective benefit by not acting at all. Such an in-
dividual would rather "free-ride" off of the efforts of others, particularly
when participation yields no greater payoff.73 Even if a large community
has the right to vote, the argument goes, the fact that rational individuals
think in this utility-maximizing manner will result in many people not vot-
ing.74
So could lawful permanent residents, if given the vote, ever rid them-
selves of this collective action dilemma? According to Olson, there is hope.
Individuals must have a reason, or be offered incentives, for why it is in
their interest to pursue this particular route.75 Such incentives may take a
variety of forms. In a classic article, Peter Clark and James Q. Wilson noted
that incentives can be material in nature, whereby members are offered
tangible benefits or are permitted to be heavily involved in the group's de-
cision-making strategies.7 6 Incentives may also be solidary, whereby mem-
bers are promised that they can develop important "social relationships with
other group members and increased status in the eyes of nonmembers."77
HART, BOUND BY OUR CONSTITUTION: WOMEN, WORKERS, AND THE MINIMUM WAGE (1994); NANCY
MCGLEN & KAREN O'CONNOR, WOMEN'S RIGHTS (1983); KAREN O'CONNOR, WOMEN'S
ORGANIZATIONS USE OF COURTS (1980); VIRGINIA SAPIRO, THE POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF WOMEN
(1983); and Reva Siegel, Text in Context: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Per-
spective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001).
71 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
72 Id.
73 See generally G. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
74 OLSON, supra note 71.
75 Id.
76 See Peter Clark & James Q. Wilson, Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations, 6 ADMIN.
SCI. Q. 129 (1961). See also TERRY MOE, THE ORGANIZATION OF INTERESTS: INCENTIVES AND THE
INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS (1980); Rothenberg, supra note 9; Robert Salis-
bury, An Exchange Theory ofInterest Groups, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 1 (1969).
77 See FRANK BAUMGARTNER & BETH LEECH, BASIC INTERESTS: THE IMPORTANCE OF GROUPS
IN POLITICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 69 (1998). See also Clarke & Wilson, supra note 76.
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Or incentives may be purposive, whereby members are told that by joining
they will be able to quench their ideological ambitions and goals.7 8
Furthermore, since permanent residents are not a homogenous group,
more often than not they break down into various communities, typically
along the lines of ethnicity, language, race, and/or national origin.7 9 Sub-
groups, under an Olsonian perspective, more easily can overcome collec-
tive action problems. Smaller communities often have fewer bureaucratic
obstacles in organizing, and their members likely have less divergent inter-
ests than those who belong to larger communities."0 Otherwise put, there is
a better chance for harmony among the like-minded members of smaller
communities, and because of their "smallness," members are able more
fully to share and enjoy accrued benefits. However, smaller communities
are not immune from free-riders. Similar to the solution offered for larger
groups, Olson suggests that incentives must be provided in order to retain
and recruit members to the movement.81
Assuming permanent residents were to receive suffrage-rights then,
who might provide the necessary incentives to ensure that these individuals
would vote? In my view, lawyers are one possible set of leaders who can
make such an offer. The idea that leaders in general can be critical incen-
tive-givers for members of emerging social movements was recognized by
Olson, who believed such organizational entrepreneurs were essential to the
mobilization process. 82 Robert Salisbury, similarly, saw entrepreneurial
leaders as creators of organizations and movements who could offer poten-
tial members incentives to join the cause.8 3 Successful entrepreneurial lead-
ers, in return, gained a legitimate job, a position of relative power, a con-
78 Id. For an important discussion of incentives in general, see GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 21.
These scholars critique those legal, economics, and political science scholars who believe that incen-
tives can be comprehensively explained by using a materialistic-based, cost-benefit model. Green and
Shapiro chide this viewpoint by asking in their study: if this were true, how do we explain why people
vote? According to their argument, there are significant costs associated with voting-from the time and
effort spent going to the polls, to sometimes waiting in long lines, to going through the hassle of regis-
tering and filing the proper forms. Especially given the fact that one's individual vote is unlikely to
make a significant difference, why would people act in such an "irrational" manner? For Green and
Shapiro, there are obvious non-material incentives for going to the polls, and they deride cost-benefit
scholars who originally failed to take this into account. For a countering opinion, see FRIEDMAN, supra
note 21.
79 For studies that have examined this point in detail, see: R. BOOTH FOWLER, RELIGION AND
POLITICS IN AMERICA (1985); MICHAEL OMI & HAROLD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES FROM THE 1960'S TO THE 1990's (1994); and M. CRAWFORD YOUNG, THE POLITICS OF
CULTURAL PLURALISM (1976).
80 See id.
81 See generally OLSON, supra note 71.
82 Id.
83 See Salisbury, supra note 76.
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stituency, and administration over a diverse, potent set of resources.14 As
Frank Baumgartner and Beth Leech have noted, entrepreneurial leaders
have "been recognized by virtually every researcher of group origins and
maintenance since Salisbury [and Olson] introduced the concept. 85
Building on this literature, I suggest that if permanent residents are to
be a force within the American polity, it is necessary that they be led by
strong leaders who possess the ability to articulate why becoming involved
in electoral politics is so important. I focus on the role that lawyers can
play, although I recognize that non-lawyers too often perform critical func-
tions on behalf of their constituents. In fact, as I will discuss, my descrip-
tion of what lawyers could do to mobilize permanent residents will not
seem "lawyerly" at all to many, in that litigation is not central to their tacti-
cal arsenal. But that is exactly the point. Contrary to the common percep-
tion, the activities of such lawyers do not necessarily have to involve using
the formal judicial process. 86 Let us now turn to examining some of the
ways in which these lawyers might be useful in helping enfranchised per-
manent residents exercise their rights.
B. From Individuals with the Right to Vote, to Politicized Individuals
As I have suggested, permanent resident communities are best served
by not just having the franchise but also by having leaders who can trans-
form this right into a vehicle for accomplishing social change. Lawyers
who work within such an immigrant movement are one set of leaders who
can enable this to occur. I mentioned above how voting rights granted to
African Americans after the Civil War and to women in 1920 did not auto-
matically result in these groups rushing to the ballot boxes.87 Rather, it took
the efforts of leaders within these communities, many of whom were law-
yers, to help articulate for these constituencies why they needed to vote. For
immigrant communities, what might lawyers, in particular, do to help make
the right to vote a meaningful political tool, and are there historical lessons
these lawyers might draw on to assist in their efforts?
Perhaps most obviously, one contribution lawyers might make to im-
migrant communities just receiving the right to vote would be to represent
84 Id. See also BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 77, at 69-70.
85 See BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 77, at 70. For scholarship that deals with issues of
group origins and movement maintenance, see: MOE, supra note 76; Rothenberg, supra note 9; and Jack
L. Walker, The Origins and Maintenance ofInterest Groups, 77 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 390 (1983).
86 For a nice critique of this misperception and of the anti-lawyer movement more generally, see
Ed Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Cri-
tique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509 (1984).
87 See sources cited supra notes 69-70.
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these individuals in court, in the event that the state or private citizens
would attempt to impair them from exercising this right. Of course, voting
rights litigation initiated by civil rights attorneys representing African
Americans, Latinos, and other minorities has historical precedent in the
United States.88 Numerous scholars have written about the various ways
civil rights lawyers have used the courts as a means of ensuring that these
communities enjoy their constitutional right of suffrage.89 And despite the
fact that certain civil rights activists have at times questioned the usefulness
of engaging in the legal and electoral processes, 90 generally accepted senti-
ment is that lawyers in many cases, through litigation, have helped minori-
ties better exercise their voting rights.
But as discussed above litigation can be both a time-consuming and
resource-heavy endeavor. For this reason, using the courts, contrary to
popular belief, is not the only way lawyers can serve their clients or con-
stituents. For example, lawyers working on behalf of immigrant communi-
ties might engage in seemingly more basic, albeit still important, services.
As lawyers and policy leaders from the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People's Legal Defense Fund (NAACP LDF) did
during the 1960s and 1970s, immigrant-rights lawyers similarly could be
useful in organizing transportation of enfranchised permanent residents to
polling stations.91 While the NAACP LDF of course played an active role
88 For a sample of voting rights cases that bear this point out, consult the Department of Justice's
webpages that detail the work done on the Voting Rights Act (1965) and its subsequent amendments.
See, e.g., Major Section 2 Cases, Dept. of Justice Civil Rights Division, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_2/major.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2004); About Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, Dept. of Justice Civil Rights Division, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/caseactiv.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2004).
89 For a selected sample of writings, see: HOWARD BALL ET AL., COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE:
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT (1982); CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING
(Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992); CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK
INTERESTS: THE REPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CONGRESS (1993); ABIGAIL M.
THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS (1987);
and Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral
Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077 (1991).
90 For works discussing this point, see: MICHAEL MCCANN, TAKING REFORM SERIOUSLY (1986);
ADOLPH REED, THE JESSE JACKSON PHENOMENON: THE CRISIS OF PURPOSES IN AFRO-AMERICAN
POLITICS (1986); and Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests
in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
91 The NAACP website provides a rich history of the types of tactics organizational policy-makers
have used to realize their rights, including tactics that involve get-out-the vote strategies. See Our Past
and Your Future, NAACP Timeline, at http://www.naacp.org/past future/naacptimeline.shtml (last
visited Apr. 18, 2004) [hereinafter, NAACP Timeline]. For an even more recent article showing how
NAACP officials continue to engage in this activity, see Jenel Few, NAACP Urges Georgians to Stand
up and be Counted, SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS ON THE WEB, Nov. 19, 1999, available at
http://www.savannahnow.com/stories/l 11999/LOCnaacpaction.shtml (last visited Apr. 18, 2004). For a
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"in crafting and enacting the Voting Rights Act of 1965," ' lawyers from
this group also recognized that it was a struggle for many African Ameri-
cans even to get to the voting booth in the first place. Thus, they organized
free buses and other means of transportation to ensure that their constitu-
ents had not just the right but also the access and ability to vote. 93 Similarly,
one can imagine that many newly enfranchised permanent residents too
may have difficulty reaching the appropriate polling stations; lawyers who
are familiar with such a population might well fill the role of a transporta-
tion organizer.
There are other ways immigrant-rights lawyers could be of service as
well. They could monitor relevant statutory proceedings occurring in the
state legislatures and in Congress in order to ensure that the acquired voting
rights of permanent residents are not somehow being curtailed. Several
scholars who have tracked various other interest groups and social move-
ments have noted that lawyers working for these constituencies often view
legislative monitoring as a key aspect of their professional duties.94 On a
related note, one can imagine immigrant-rights lawyers acting as useful
advocates in governmental hearings conducted by bureaucratic agencies or
legislative committees, if the subject of immigrant suffrage ever was to
arise. Here too, scholars who have studied the behavior of other types of
organizational and social movement lawyers find that testifying in such
settings is not an uncommon practice.95
Furthermore, lawyers representing immigrant communities could
serve as coalition builders with other potential policy partners to promote
greater voting access. While alone, a minority group with the right to vote
may have difficulty effectuating significant political and social change, if
that group can partner up with other similarly situated groups in the classic
Madisonian sense, 96 then achieving such change may be more successful.
sample of scholarly sources on this point, see generally MINNIE FINCH, THE NAACP, ITS FIGHT FOR
JUSTICE (1981); MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM AND REBELLION: THE SECOND
RECONSTRUCTION IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945-1982 (1984); and CHRISTOPHER ROBERT REED, THE
CHICAGO NAACP: RISE OF BLACK PROFESSIONAL LEADERSHIP, 1910-1966 (1997).
92 NAACP Legal Defense Fund, at http://www.naacpldf.org/legalprogram/pparticipation.html
(last visited Apr. 18, 2004).
93 See sources cited supra note 91.
94 See, e.g., JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., THE HOLLOW CORE: PRIVATE INTERESTS IN NATIONAL
POLICYMAKING 65 (1993); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 150 (1986); Anthony J. Nownes & Patricia Freeman, Interest Group
Activity in the States, 60 J. POL. 86 (1998).
95 The findings in each of the studies in footnote 94 note this point.
96 See JAMES MADISON, FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 10 & No. 51. For a classic rebuttal of the Madi-
sonian argument, see ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956).
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Surely lawyers can play a critical role in facilitating this type of coalition
building. Consider the events leading up to the 1982 amendments to the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. 97 Among the major elements of the 1982
amendments included an extension of Section 5, a provision within the
original 1965 Voting Rights Act that barred a jurisdiction from altering its
voting structure without first gaining pre-clearance from a U.S. federal dis-
trict court or from the U.S. Attorney General.98
Section 5 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act was set to expire five years
after being passed.99 But in 1970 Congress extended this provision an addi-
tional five years, and in 1975 Congress extended it again, this time for an
additional seven years. 100 Beginning in the late 1970s, leaders from the
NAACP, including lawyers working for the group's Legal Defense Fund,
began considering ways to extend Section 5 for a much longer period of
time.10' These leaders started reaching out to policy partners with whom
they had worked before, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, the
Southern Christian Leadership Council, the Congress of Racial Equality,
the National Urban League, and various other groups in order to garner
support for their proposal. 10 2 Soon a number of organizations were clamor-
ing for a long-term extension of Section 5, and by 1982 Congress re-
sponded by setting 2007 as the year when Section 5 would need to be re-
newed.10 3 In turn, lawyers and other policy leaders from the NAACP in-
voked this victory during their voter registration drive that same year-
97 See William Eskridge, Philip Frickey, And Elizabeth Garnett, Legislation 146-150 (2001).
98 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2000) (codifying Section 5). The list of jurisdictions that fall under the
Section 5 pre-clearance regulations can be found on the Department of Justice website. Section 5 Cov-
ered Jurisdictions, Dept. of Justice Civil Rights Division, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/covered.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2004).
99 See sources cited supra note 98.
100 A detailed history of the Section 5 extensions can be found on the Department of Justice's
website. The Voting Act of 1965, Dept. of Justice Civil Rights Division, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/intro/introb.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2004). Several observers also
have commented on Section 5. For a sample of selected readings, see generally: Scott Gluck, Congres-
sional Reaction to Judicial Construction of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29 COLUM. J. L.
SOC. PROBS. 337 (1996); Laughlin McDonald, Racial Fairness-Why Shouldn't It Apply to Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act, 21 STETSON L. REV. 847 (1992); and Victor Andres Rodriguez, Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 After Boerne: The Beginning of the End of Preclearance, 91 CAL. L. REV.
769 (2003).
101 See NAACP Timeline, supra note 91 (noting that during the period discussed in the text, "the
NAACP leads the effort to extend The Voting Rights Act for another [twenty-five] years").
102 Id. The NAACP maintains a list of its numerous coalition partners. See Associations, NAACP,
at http://www.naacp.org/connections/assoc.shtm (last visited Apr. 18, 2004).
103 The U.S. Department of Justice has a full discussion regarding the extension of Section 5 on its
website. See Introduction to Section 5 Preclearance, Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/about.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2004).
[VOL. 11:4
MOBILIZING IMMIGRANTS
which resulted in registering 850,000 new voters."° That civil rights law-
yers played an important role building coalitions for the purposes of push-
ing through enhanced voting rights legislation (and registering more voters)
could serve as another type of educative cue for immigrant-rights lawyers
contemplating how they too might assist newly enfranchised permanent
residents.' 05
In addition to all of these activities, lawyers may play a significant
discursive role when serving as leaders of an immigrant community.
Through the power of rhetoric and persuasion, lawyers may be able to ex-
plain to their constituents why voting is so important. We see that lawyers
from both the women's suffrage movement and the civil rights movement
engaged in this activity during each of these respective eras.10 6 As these
leaders recognized, having the right to vote was one thing, but seeing to it
that enfranchised citizens exercised this right was quite another. For exam-
ple, lawyers for the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), a well-known
civil rights organization founded in Alabama in 1971,07 for decades have
championed the right to vote by publishing books, papers, and other docu-
ments as part of a wider informational campaign on the normative value of
voting.108 SPLC lawyers have focused, in particular, on the issue of redis-
tricting, advocating that by voting, "everyday citizens-those who are most
harmed by poorly created voting districts-can become the driving force
behind the redistricting process."' 0 9 In fact, in an impassioned plea to their
constituents, the SPLC in its most recent publication entitled Drawing the
Line, states:
The future of your right to vote is at stake. Your community, your state and the country are
now drawing election lines that will determine how your vote is counted for the next ten
104 See NAACP Timeline, supra note 91 (commenting on its voter registration initiative following
its efforts to get Section 5 extended).
105 Another aspect to the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 involved Section 2.
Section 2 of the Act prohibited state and local governments from disadvantaging or diluting the impact
of minority voters' votes in an election. (Jurisdictions might do this by, for example, dividing minorities
along district lines in order to prevent them from building coalitions to have their preferred candidate
elected, or by mandating an at-large voting process, where it is known that the result will have a dis-
criminatory impact on minority voters.) In 1982, Congress reaffirmed the principle that Section 2 had to
be preserved, and moreover, went on to state that so long as a discriminatory impact was present on
minority voters, no discriminatory intent on the part of the jurisdiction was necessary. Cf. White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
106 I shall explain how in the subsequent paragraphs.
107 See Southern Poverty Law Center, at http://www.splcenter.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2004).
108 Id.
109 See Drawing the Line, Southern Poverty Law Center, at
http://www.tolerance.org/digdeeper/dtl/index.htmi (last visited Apr. 18, 2004) (on voting and redis-
tricting).
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years. The Florida vote count during the last Presidential election taught us that it's essential
for everyone to vote-and for those votes to be counted. If you care about fair elections-if
you want to make sure your voice is heard-get involved in the redistricting process ....
With the information in this manual, you can take action to make sure that your voice-your
vote-is heard and counted throughout the next decade.010
There is no reason to believe that immigrant-rights lawyers could not
engage in disseminating information in a similar manner, as a means of
advocating to permanent residents why exercising the right to vote is so
important.
Immigrant-rights lawyers might also look to how suffragette lawyers
used discourse at the grassroots level to educate women about the signifi-
cance of voting.I"' Virginia Drachman's historical account details how after
1920 these activists sought to teach women about issues of political en-
gagement, equal rights, and the ability to influence legislation and public
policy through the power of voting. 12 During this time, women's rights
lawyers also worked with the League of Women Voters, which was argua-
bly the most prominent organization that grew out of the suffragist move-
ment." 3 The goal that the League and the lawyers had was simple: to ar-
ticulate to the newly enfranchised woman how, through voting, she might
be able to affect broad social policy issues such as preventing child labor,
increasing the minimum wage, mandating compulsory education, and fur-
thering access to employment.' 14 As the then President of the League, Car-
rie Chapman Catt, noted: "The politicians used to ask us why we wanted
the vote. They seemed to think that we want to do something particular
with it, something we were not telling about. They did not understand that
women wanted to help make the general welfare."' 15
Thus, whether it is through publications, grassroots educational ef-
forts, or oration, lawyers can use a variety of discursive techniques to show
to their constituents how voting can connect to other types of political
rights and values." 6 Ideas and proposals on voting indeed can serve as a
110 Id.
111 See generally VIRGINIA G. DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW: WOMEN LAWYERS IN MODERN
AMERICAN HISTORY (1998).
112 Id. See generally EDWARD T. JAMES ET AL., NOTABLE AMERICAN WOMEN (1971).
113 See League of Women Voters, at http://www.lwv.org/about/past.html (last visited Apr. 18,
2004).
114 Id.
115 See League History, League of Women Voters' Website, at
http://www.lwv.org/about/pastfuture/pasthistory.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2004).
116 Reva Siegel, in a recent article, discusses how leaders of women's movements, both during the
early 1900s as well as during the debate over the Equal Rights Amendment in the 1970s, invoked the
rhetoric of the Constitution in order to advance the progressive idea that through participating in poli-
tics, women could raise their overall status within society. See Siegel, supra note 70. As she notes,
Both the ERA and the Nineteenth Amendment demonstrate how the text of the Constitution makes the
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springboard for encouraging greater political involvement and civic partici-
pation." 7 That immigrant-rights lawyers might be capable of employing
such a course of action on behalf of newly enfranchised permanent resi-
dents seems clearly within the realm of possibility as well.
But as Barbara Babcock reminds us, voting does not necessarily have
to be an instrumental tool for achieving some other type of objective.1 8 For
example, there were women lawyers during the early 1900s who believed
that the right to vote, on its own, had immense intrinsic value for all
women.19 The hugely symbolic importance of this precious right was not
lost on these advocates championing for suffrage. 20 Women lawyers such
terms of our constitutional tradition amenable to contestation by mobilized groups of citizens, acting
inside and outside the formal procedures of the legal system. It is, most often, as text that the Constitu-
tion is the object of social movement struggle. Text matters in our tradition because it is the site of
understandings and practices that authorize, encourage, and empower ordinary citizens to make claims
on the Constitution's meaning.
Id. at 299.
117 For example, several academics advocating on behalf of historically disenfranchised groups
have championed the idea of cumulative voting as a means of fostering greater participation in the
political process and "civic inclusion." See, e.g., Pamela Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of
Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173 (1989).
Lani Guinier also has long argued that embracing cumulative voting, or the practice of allowing each
voter in a jurisdiction the ability to cast multiple votes for one or more competing candidates, strikes at
the heart of ensuring that voters are truly and equally represented. She and several scholars contend that
in single-member, winner-take-all districts, large numbers of voters who might have supported the
losing candidate can wind up having their interests ignored. Conversely, the argument goes, having a
system where a jurisdiction has multiple seats and allows voters to cast multiple votes for any one or
more candidate vying for these seats, provides a greater opportunity for a wider array of interests to be
represented. The literature on the pros and cons of cumulative voting is extensive, and obviously the
goal here is not to survey and evaluate the merits of these arguments. Rather the key for us is that ideas
and discursive rhetoric can and do matter. For a selected sample of readings see Lani Guinier, No Two
Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413 (1991). See also LANI GUINIER,
TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994);
Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Cumulative Voting and Minority Candidates: An Analysis of the
1991 Peoria City Council Elections, 225 AM. POL'Y. REV. 225 (1996); Robert Brischetto, Cumulative
Voting as an Alternative to Districting: An Exit Survey of Sixteen Texas Communities, NAT'L CIVIC
REV., Fall/Winter 1995, at 347-54; Richard Engstrom et al., Cumulative Voting as a Remedy for Minori-
ty Vote Dilution: The Case ofAlamogordo, New Mexico, 5 J.L. & POL. 469 (1989); Richard H. Pildes &
Kristen A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the United States. 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 312 (1995).
118 See Barbara Allen Babcock, Foreword: A Real Revolution, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1791 (2001);
Barbara Allen Babcock, Feminist Lawyers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1695 (1998) (reviewing VIRGINIA
DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW: WOMEN LAWYERS IN MODERN AMERICAN HISTORY (1998)) [hereinafter,
Babcock, Feminist Lawyers]; Barbara Allen Babcock, Western Women Lawyers, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2179
(1993).
119 Babcock, Feminist Lawyers, supra note 118, at 1702.
120 Id. at 1696. Babcock notes that during the suffragette mobilization era, their position in society
was "fused from the beginning with the larger struggle for suffrage and other rights .... Id. at 1695.
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as Margaret Anderson, 121 Olga Bennett, 122 Lela Robinson, 123 and Clara
Folz, 124 would often stress the inherent significance of suffrage when seek-
ing to mobilize their constituents. For lawyers working with immigrant-
movements today, this historical lesson is useful because it shows that
when engaging in discourse as a means of highlighting the significance of
voting, other "larger" issues need not necessarily be included in the dia-
logue. 1
25
Yet while this right to vote may indeed have inherent significance,
even if suffrage were to be granted to permanent residents, existing political
obstacles may be such that this once disenfranchised group still may feel
excluded from the democratic process. Babcock and others have noted that
because of the entrenched political inequality that continued to persist in
She goes on to say: "voting ... involved an unambiguous passage into the public sphere .... That is
why ... all women lawyers wanted suffrage, and why many actively campaigned for it." Id at 1696.
And as she notes, almost ninety percent of a sample of women lawyers surveyed in 1920 believed the
Nineteenth Amendment would be critical in altering their status in society. Id at 1702.
121 See Pioneers in the Law, Margaret Reinardy Anderson, at
http://www.wisbar.orgfbar/pioneers/bios/anderson.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2004). Anderson tried to
energize women to vote by actively engaging in party politics. See id. She campaigned actively on
behalf of her husband who first ran for District Attorney in Stevens Point, Wisconsin and then for a seat
in the House of Representatives in Wisconsin's Seventh Congressional District. Id. Her husband lost the
D.A.'s race and five days before the election for Congress he died. Id. Margaret Anderson then ran in
his place, but she lost to Melvin Laird in the 1954 election.
122 See Pioneers in the Law, Olga Bennett, at http://www.wisbar.org/bar/pioneers/bios/bennett.html
(last visited Apr. 18, 2004). Bennett, like Anderson, was involved in electoral politics. Id. She was one
of the Wisconsin's first elected judges, and she sought to mobilize women to the ballot box by showing
how they could indeed be successful not just as practicing lawyers but also as elected officials. See id.
123 For work on Lela Robinson, see Douglas Lamar Jones, Leila J Robinson's Case and the Entry
of Women into the Legal Profession in Massachusetts, in THE HISTORY OF THE LAW IN
MASSACHUSETTS: THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 1692-1992 (Russell K. Osgood ed., 1992).
124 See Barbara Allen Babcock, Clara Shortridge Foltz: First Woman, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 673
(1988). See also SHARON AVEY, THE LADY LAWYER, CLARA SHORTRIDGE FOLTZ (2001).
125 Why people actually believe that their individual vote matters has been discussed and debated,
particularly in the political science literature, for years. It may be that individuals honestly perceive that
by voting, social change affecting their lives can be made. Or there may be some heightened sense of
civic duty; or a commitment to being a participant within the democratic process; or a combination of
these and other factors. For a very select sample of readings, see: ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE
AMERICAN VOTER (1960); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957); MORRIS
P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS (1976); FRIEDMAN, supra
note 21; GREEN & SHAPIRO, supra note 2 1; NORMAN H. NIE ET AL., THE CHANGING AMERICAN VOTER
(1976); FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT: POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN MISSISSIPPI AFTER
1965 (1990); KEITH REEVES, VOTING HOPES OR FEARS? WHITE VOTERS, BLACK CANDIDATES, AND
RACIAL POLITICS IN AMERICA (1997); A. Blais & R. Young, Why Do People Vote? An Experiment in
Rationality, 99 PUB. CHOICE 39 (1999); Arthur Schram & Joep Sonnemans, Why People Vote: Experi-
mental Evidence, 17 J. ECON. PSYCHOL., 417-42 (1996).
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the years following the passage of the 1920 amendment, many women,
including many women lawyers, became disillusioned with the idea that
voting could make any real difference. 126 For this reason, those few women
who were practicing law opted to focus on their careers, hoping to make
their mark in their profession-where it was perceived that they would be
more fairly judged-rather than in the biased world of politics. 127 One can
imagine that in today's political climate, with the presence of the Patriot
Act and other measures scaling back the rights of immigrants, enfranchised
permanent residents might similarly perceive participating in electoral poli-
tics as futile-or even dangerous. Arguably in this scenario then, having the
right to vote may not matter much for permanent residents, and this in turn
would naturally reduce the lawyer's ability to move people to the ballot
box. After all, if enfranchised permanent residents are determined not to
vote, even the most impassioned lawyer will have difficulty convincing
constituents to exercise this right.
In this situation then, what is the lawyer to do? There will be those
who claim that without having any specific goal on which to channel their
energies, such as mobilizing their constituents to vote, lawyers who are
working with a community of people like permanent residents will inevita-
bly revert to promoting policy tactics with which these lawyers are most
familiar-litigating and directing the group towards the judicial process. In
fact, as the argument goes, this is all but certain to occur given that in this
post 9-11 era the chances of permanent residents receiving the right to vote
in national and state elections are slim to none. 121 In the next section, Sec-
tion IV, I will explain in detail why many observers worry about the gen-
eral presence of lawyers within a political group or social movement. Fol-
lowing this discussion, I then will suggest that even if lawyers are not
working on a particular goal, such as mobilizing voters, their general or
overall presence can still be valuable for protecting the political interests of
the constituents they represent.
126 See Babcock, Feminist Lawyers, supra note 118, at 1702-03. See also RONALD CHESTER,
UNEQUAL ACCESS: WOMEN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING AMERICA (1985); Virginia G. Drachman, The
New Woman Lawyer and the Challenge of Sexual Equality in Early Twentieth-Century America, 28
IND. L. REv. 227 (1995). For another important article on woman lawyers, see Ann Juergens, Lena
Olive Smith: A Minnesota Civil Rights Pioneer, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 398 (2001).
127 Id.
128 Interestingly, according to a recent article, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg's Char-
ter Commission soon "will reportedly formally announce its intention to ask Governor George Pataki
and the New York State Legislature to allow green-card holders who live in New York to vote in local
elections." Michael Huang, Citizenship and Voting, GOTHAM GAZETrE.COM, Aug. 25, 2003, available
at http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/feature-commentary/20030825/202/503 (last visited Apr. 18,
2004). How this initiative might affect whether non-citizens gain the right to vote in state and national
elections remains uncertain.
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III. LAWYERS AND THEIR GENERAL IMPACT ON IMMIGRANT
COMMUNITIES
A. The Skeptics'Point of View
Indeed, since the events of 9-11, it is difficult to imagine that perma-
nent residents will be receiving the right to vote anytime soon. I described
above that were these immigrants granted full voting rights, lawyers-
drawing on the experiences of their predecessors who worked with the
women's suffrage movement and the civil rights movement-likely could
contribute in many different ways to getting permanent residents to the
ballot box. But even without hope of receiving full suffrage rights, lawyers
still may be highly useful in politically mobilizing immigrants. No doubt
this assertion will make some observers cringe. Over the past thirty years,
there has been a wave of scholarship critical of the role lawyers play within
emerging social organizations.1 29 In the mid-1970s, Derrick Bell published
his famous article, entitled "Serving Two Masters," where he evaluated the
impact that lawyers had on the fight for educational desegregation. 3 ' Ac-
cording to Bell, because the desegregation movement relied on lawyers to
guide its strategies, too often litigation was used as the main means for im-
plementing social change. Lawyers, so preoccupied with devising strategies
to win doctrinal arguments in court, lost touch with the real life concerns of
their constituents.'31 Instead of thinking about creating policies to ensure
that minority children had better educational opportunities, the lawyers
involved were obsessed with convincing judges that they were right on the
merits of their case. As a result, important "political, economic, and so-
cial" '132 concerns were ignored much to the detriment of the African Ameri-
can community at large. 33
Those who oppose having lawyers serve as leaders within permanent
resident communities also might point to other empirical works for support.
For example, two years before the publication of Bell's article, Stuart
Scheingold released his landmark book, The Politics of Rights.'3 4 In this
study, Scheingold observed that lawyers who headed social activist move-
129 The literature that is cited, referenced, and reviewed here comes from the comprehensive bibli-
ography provided by McCann & Silverstein, supra note 6, at 288-92.
130 See Bell, Jr., supra note 90.
131 Id. See also MARK TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925-1952 (1987).
132 See Bell, Jr., supra note 90, at 516.
133 Id. at 475-516.
134 See SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS, supra note 9.
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ments frequently lacked the skills as well as the desire to employ litigation
in conjunction with other political tactics. Given the scarce space within the
American political arena, Scheingold found that such movements had trou-
ble competing with those organizations that structured their strategies using
both legal and political action. 35 In 1978, Joel Handler came out with his
study on lawyer-led social movements. 36 Handler discovered that these
leaders tended to be driven more by an ambition to enhance their personal
reputations than by a desire to meet the needs of their constituents. 137
Empirical studies published during the 1980s offered further ammuni-
tion to those who might question the wisdom of having lawyers lead per-
manent resident communities. 38 Jack Katz's study of lawyers who work on
behalf of the poor illustrates that while these lawyers believed that victories
through litigation positively affected their clients' lives, the perceptions and
realities of the clients themselves were far different.'39 Other works fol-
lowed showing disparities between the lawyers' visions of the transforma-
tive power of the law, and the true impact that these legal changes had on
client communities. 140 For example, Gerald Lopez's 1992 study contended
that poor and minority communities are routinely disempowered by lawyers
seeking to control their clients' agenda. 4' Lawyers, according to Lopez,
tend to reify the formal distinctions between themselves and their clients,
thereby creating a mystification of what legal practice entails.142 Lopez
argues that lawyers maintain this reification by focusing on litigation as a
means to satisfy their personal ambitions. All the while, the lawyer remains
either unaware or unconcerned that the amount of time and money that this
tactic consumes works to the ultimate detriment of the clients' interest. Too
often, then, clients are left confused and frustrated, believing that their sub-
stantive concerns have been relegated to the backbumer.143 As one observer
has noted, Lopez's findings offer "some [important] empirical evidence
supporting... [the] assertion that lawyers often dominate poor clients."'"
135 Id. at Ch. 6.
136 See generally HANDLER, supra note 7.
137 Id.
138 See, e.g., AREYH NEIER, ONLY JUDGMENT: THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION IN SOCIAL CHANGE
(1982).
139 See generally KATZ, supra note 7.
140 See, e.g., O'NEILL, supra note 8; Neal Milner, The Dilemmas of Legal Mobilization: Ideologies
and Strategies of Mental Patient Liberation, 8 LAW & POL'Y 105 (1986); Nikolas Rose, Unreasonable
Rights: Mental Illness and the Limits of Law, 12 J. LAW & SOC'Y 199 (1985). For a summary of these
points, see McCann & Silverstein, supra note 6, at 262-63.
141 See GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE
LAW PRACTICE (1992).
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Ann Southworth, Taking the Lawyer out of Progressive Lawyering, 46 STAN. L. REV. 214, 215
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All of these studies reveal that lawyers distort the importance of pursu-
ing causes through litigation and underestimate the significance of consid-
ering alternative approaches. 145 Yet, there is no better support for the posi-
tion that communities ought to contemplate seriously the value of relying
on lawyers than Gerald Rosenberg's book, The Hollow Hope.1 46 In this rich
study, Rosenberg tackles the question of whether pursuing litigation is the
best method for bringing about social change. 47 Rosenberg argues that
because courts are constrained by several factors-including their lack of
enforcement power, their heavy reliance on other institutions to produce
reform, and their constitutional obligation to hear only cases in contro-
versy-they are precluded from making substantive social changes. 148
Many lawyer-led movements, however, fail to acknowledge these obstacles
and too often follow a (judicial) path that rarely results in achieving desired
outcomes. Moreover, since the pursuit of litigation is expensive and time-
consuming, resources that otherwise could have been devoted to developing
sustained political action and grassroots awareness are needlessly expended
on a costly and ineffective tactic.' 49 Kevin Johnson, in his work on Latino
communities in the U.S., has also recognized that this "need for an empha-
sis on political mobilization results in large part from deficiencies of tradi-
tional legal strategies."' 5° And in summarizing this argument, Michael
McCann and Helen Silverstein state:
[T]he inclination of lawyers to frame movement goals in terms of disputes among discrete
parties can narrow the range of movement demands as well as undermine broad-based
movement organization and alliance building. The result is a tendency to atomize struggles,
dividing and separating rather than uniting those who desire social change. 5'
Thus, there are numerous concerns in having lawyers serve as leaders
within emerging social movements. Perhaps for good reason then, much
(1993).
145 See Bell, Jr., supra note 90; MCCANN, RIGHTS, supra note 6; Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology
of Rights Consciousness and the Pact of Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1563 (1984); Tushnet, An
Essay, supra note 9.
146 See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 9.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 13-21.
149 Id.
150 Johnson, Civil Rights, supra note 12, at 43. Note, however, that Johnson's perspective is impor-
tant because he is very sensitive in recognizing that movement-leaders in various situations have been
able to incorporate both legal and political strategies effectively. This point is what I seek to emphasize
in the next section.
151 McCann & Silverstein, supra note 6, at 263. Note, as we will see, this is not the position held
by McCann and Silverstein; this is again only their summary of this argument.
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skepticism might exist towards my assertion that lawyers could be a valu-
able resource for permanent resident communities seeking to participate in
the political process. But while the empirical evidence just provided ques-
tions whether lawyers are the appropriate people to assume this responsibil-
ity, there is another side to this debate. As I shall next argue, even if perma-
nent residents lack the right to vote, lawyers can do much more for an im-
migrant movement than solely focusing on which cases to take to court and
when.
B. The Contribution of Lawyers, Even Absent Suffrage Rights for Immi-
grants
Lawyers may employ their talents in a variety of ways to help non-
enfranchised permanent residents politically mobilize. Pursuing litigation
surely is one option. Consider some of the rights currently possessed by
permanent residents in this country. Permanent residents have the right to
social welfare benefits, 152 the right to work in state civil service jobs,'53 the
right to state education, 15 4 and even the right to practice law.' Permanent
residents gained these entitlements in large part because of the successful
efforts of hard-working and intelligent lawyers. 56
But in general, most social movement lawyers know that relying on
litigation as the sole or even a primary tactic has its drawbacks. For one
thing, there can be a huge lag between the time a lawsuit is initiated and the
time it is resolved.' 57 Lawyers also know that favorable decisions from
courts may not always translate into beneficial results. 158 And the fact is
that litigation at times simply may not work. Thus, when social movement
lawyers use the courts, most do so in a sophisticated manner.15 9 For exam-
152 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 378-79 (1971).
153 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 651 (1973).
154 Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (noting that both legal and illegal immigrants have a
right to state education under the Equal Protection Clause).
155 In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 718 (1973).
156 For an eloquent study highlighting the ability of legal elites to mobilize constituents in this
manner, see John Kilwein, Still Trying: Cause Lawyering for the Poor and Disadvantaged in Pitts-
burgh, Pennsylvania, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES 181-200 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).
157 See, e.g., STEPHEN WASBY, RACE RELATIONS LITIGATION IN AN AGE OF COMPLEXITY 76
(1995); Kevin den Dulk, Prophets in Caesar's Court (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Wisconsin-Madison, on file with author).
158 See Gregg Ivers, Please God, Save this Honorable Court, in THE INTEREST GROUP
CONNECTION: ELECTIONEERING, LOBBYING AND POLICYMAKING IN WASHINGTON (Paul Hermson ed.,
1998).
159 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward an Understanding of the
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ple, litigation is frequently seen as having not only direct but also "indirect
benefits."'1 60 In her valuable study of immigrants in Britain, Susan Sterett
discusses how lawyers working with the South Asian community often
know that winning immigration cases in court is rare. 16 Yet, these lawyers
have not abandoned this tactic, namely because "litigation can be a way of
gaining public time. Cases can be part of an effort to elevate an issue to the
political agenda, occupying time in Parliament and the newspapers."'
' 62
Perhaps put more generally, lawyers can use litigation to serve an edu-
cative function. Recall Gerald Neuman's argument, which focuses on how
lawyers for permanent residents should be able to win the right to vote for
their clients on equal protection grounds. To a certain degree, though, fo-
cusing on the outcome of such litigation detracts from the fact that just tak-
ing such a case to court allows a lawyer to raise the public's consciousness
towards the range of issues facing permanent resident communities, includ-
ing their lack of suffrage.1 63 Moreover, skillful lawyers coordinate litigation
with other strategies, such as those that are more grassroots in nature.'
64
Susan Coutin amplifies this point in her study of immigration lawyers in
Los Angeles. 165 Coutin's description centers on how this group of lawyers
used charlas, or public talks at town hall meetings, to publicize, in this case
to Salvadoran and Guatemalan non-citizens, the intricacies and flaws of
Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 31-68 (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold
eds., 1998). See also Stuart A. Scheingold & Anne Bloom, Transgressive Cause Lawyering: Practice
Sites and the Politicization of the Professional, 5 INT'L LEGAL PROF. 209 (1998).
160 See McCann & Silverstein, supra note 6, at 267.
161 Susan Sterett, Caring about Individual Cases: Immigration Lawyering in Britain, in CAUSE
LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 293-316 (Austin Sarat
& Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).
162 Id. at 310.
163 See McCann & Silverstein, supra note 6, at 267; MCCANN, RIGHTS, supra note 6.
164 See McCann & Silverstein, supra note 6, at 268. For one thing, there is research documenting
how lawyers constantly consider costs before making even the slightest tactical decision. In fact, as
Stephen Wasby has noted, most legal elites resignedly accept that the availability of resources "both
force choices and limits them." WASBY, supra note 157. Understanding the different constraints that
face them, apt legal entrepreneurs thus recognize that they must consider other, more politically-based
tactics, if they wish to see their agendas realized. See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER & LEECH, supra note 77;
CHARLES Epp, RIGHTS REVOLUTION: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL
MOBILIZATION 58-61, 69-70 (1998); HANDLER, supra note 7, 25-35; FRANK SORAUF, THE WALL OF
SEPARATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF CHURCH AND STATE 42 (1976). WASBY, supra note
157, at 81; Milner, supra note 140.
165 Susan Coutin, Cause Lawyering in the Shadow of the State: A U.S. Immigration Example, in
CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN THE GLOBAL ERA 117-40 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold
eds., 2001).
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U.S. immigration law.'66 In addition to offering legal advice and represent-
ing clients in court, these lawyers would use charlas "[t]o educate immi-
grants about their rights, enable immigrants to devise viable legalizations
strategies, dispel popular misconceptions about immigration law, and help
immigrants to recast their own experiences in legal terms."'16 7 As Coutin
explains, the lawyers contemplated advancing the rights of immigrants in
terms of litigation and in terms of political education, publicity, and overall
movement building.168
Lawyers also can use their knowledge of, and experience with, litiga-
tion as a leveraging tool. Where immigrant communities face neglect or
discrimination-whether it is from private citizens, businesses, or govern-
ment entities-lawyers can wield the threat of litigation as a powerful tool
to extract concessions. 169 Some of the most impressive evidence highlight-
ing this point comes from the work done by the late Cesar Chavez. Chavez,
a Mexican-American migrant farmer activist who eventually became the
president of the United Farm Workers of America, spent his life advocating
on behalf immigrant laborers. 17  Through his tireless efforts, Chavez
achieved several accomplishments, including providing migrant workers
with the right to bargain with their employers, better health care, higher
wages, and an overall recognition of their worth in the workplace. 7' As
observers have noted, although Chavez was not a lawyer, lawyers who rep-
resented him and his movement played a role in obtaining these benefits on
behalf of this community. 172 These lawyers worked closely with Chavez
skillfully to coordinate grassroots strategies, such as boycotts, pickets, and
marches with more formal tactics-like that of litigation. And it was not as
though these lawyers would run to court the moment they believed that
their cause was suffering a setback. Rather, when less costly (more grass-
roots-based) strategies would fail to yield concessions from those in power,
they, along with Chavez, recognized that one tactic that would often garner
attention was the threat of placing this dispute in court. Having the ability
166 Id.
167 Id. at 128.
168 Id. See also McCann & Silverstein, supra note 6, at 269.
169 This point has been made by several scholars who have studied lawyer-led interest groups and
social movements. For a selected sample of readings, see generally EPP, supra note 164; HANDLER,
supra note 7; MCCANN, RIGHTS, supra note 6; O'CONNOR, supra note 72; SORAUF supra note 164, at
42; Jayanth K. Krishnan & Kevin den Dulk, So Help Me God, 30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 233 (2002);
and Kim Lane Scheppele & Jack L. Walker, The Litigation Strategies of Interest Groups, in
MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA: PATRONS, PROFESSIONS, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Jack
L. Walker ed., 1991).
170 See CONSUELO RODRIGUEZ, CESAR CHAVEZ (1991); WINTHROP YINGER, CESAR CHAVEZ: THE
RHETORIC OF NONVIOLENCE (1975).
171 See id.; RICHARD GRISWOLD DEL CASTILLO, CESAR CHAVEZ: A TRIUMPH OF SPIRIT (1995).
172 Id. See also JACQUES E. LEVY, CESAR CHAVEZ: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LA CAUSA (1975).
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to "leverage"' 73 the law in favor of the immigrant community proved an
extremely important skill that these leaders possessed.
But it is important to remember that there are other ways that lawyers
can serve the needs of their constituents. For those permanent resident
communities interested in seeing institutional changes made from the top-
down, legislative lobbying may be an effective technique that lawyers can
employ. Given their legal education and presumed familiarity with the leg-
islative process, many lawyers will know what it takes to pass effective
legislation. Helping to draft laws, testifying in front of legislative commit-
tees, and promoting the adoption of preferred statutory language within
bills are just some of the functions that lawyers can and do perform.' 74
Also, because they understand the legalese that often lace entire pieces of
legislation, lawyers are in a good position to read and translate to their con-
stituents what certain bills mean.'75 The general literature on organizational
interests in American politics highlights this point, showing that group-
leaders routinely focus their efforts on monitoring legislative activity.'76
John Heinz and his colleagues, in particular, document how almost every
interest organization that they studied had leaders (many of whom were
lawyers) who scrutinized for their constituents the daily actions in which
members of Congress engaged. 77 Since these leaders possess the skills to
comprehend the machinations of what appears to most people as govern-
mental morass, they are able to serve as an important asset to a community
on the brink of being affected by a legislative decision.
In addition, because permanent residents cannot vote, lawyers could
engage in campaigns that encourage greater naturalization among immi-
grants.'78 As Kevin Johnson states:
173 McCann & Silverstein, supra note 6, at 268-69. For a full discussion of this point, see
McCANN, RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 168-170.
174 See ANDREW JAY KOSHNER, SOLVING THE PUZZLE OF INTEREST GROUP LITIGATION (1998);
MCCANN, RIGHTS, supra note 6; Scheppele & Walker, supra note 169; Southworth, supra note 144;
Jayanth K. Krishnan, New Politics, Public Interest Groups, and Legal Strategies in the United States and
Beyond (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, on file with author).
175 Id. See also SCHEINGOLD, supra note 9; AUSTIN SARAT & STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, CAUSE
LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA (2001); AUSTIN SARAT & STUART A. SCHEINGOLD,
CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (1998).
176 See JEFFREY M. BERRY, LOBBYING FOR THE PEOPLE: THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF PUBLIC
INTEREST GROUPS 212-52 (1977); Thomas L. Gais & Jack L. Walker, Jr., Pathways to Influence in
American Politics, in MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA 104-11 (Jack L. Walker Jr. ed.,
1991); KAY SCHLOZMAN & JOHN TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 150
(1986); Anthony Nownes & Patricia Freeman, Interest Group Activity in the States, 60 J. POL. 88, 92
(1998).
177 JOHN HEINZ ET AL., THE HOLLOW CORE: PRIVATE INTERESTS IN NATIONAL POLICYMAKING 65
(1993).
178 See Johnson, Civil Rights, supra note 12, at 51-54.
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A large population of potential Latino voters are left outside of the political process ....
This has a significant impact on Latino political participation because the lawful permanent
resident population from Mexico is substantial in size but has a relatively low naturalization
rate. New immigrants from Latin America, at least those who immigrate in compliance with
the immigration laws, are potential voters if they become citizens and thus are a potential
source of strength to the Latino community .... The fact that so many Mexican lawful per-
manent residents are in the United States suggests great potential benefits of a drive to con-
vince lawful permanent residents eligible for naturalization to become citizens and partici-
pate in the political process. 7 9
Thus, attempting to increase naturalization rates is just one other way
lawyers can help promote the immigrant communities' cause."' 0 Along
these lines, one could imagine too that once these immigrants have natural-
ized, lawyers might press for multi-lingual ballots and push for voting to
take place on multiple days or on weekends to allow for greater immigrant
turnout, to name a couple other options."'
Lawyers can engage in a significant amount of non-litigation work
that still is very much legal in nature. The "transactional" services that law-
yers can perform may be vital for an immigrant movement's continued
existence. Ann Southworth has discussed how lawyers can be involved in
"implement[ing] plans by identifying sources of capital, analyzing regula-
tory schemes, negotiating on the client's behalf, structuring relationships,
drafting agreements, and navigating procedural and political obstacles.' 82
Lawyers also can help constituents file what are often confusing immigra-
tion forms and translate into plain English the many detailed-ridden immi-
gration statutes affecting non-citizens.
Effective transactional legal entrepreneurship can be useful in other
settings. Take, for example, a group of permanent residents interested in
establishing a non-profit business in order to assist arriving non-citizens to
this country. The group could well need lawyers who, among other things,
can write-up the necessary contracts, file for tax-exempt status, obtain the
proper liability insurance, and provide advice on how to run the business
efficiently. 183 These legal experts can also be helpful in dealing with local
citizen groups, government officials, and other business associations in the
179 Id. at 52-53.
180 Id. at 54-55.
181 For a discussion of alternative proposals such as the ones mentioned here, see generally:
RAYMOND TATALOVICH, NATIVISM REBORN? (1995); Yxta Maya Murray, The Latino American Crisis
of Citizenship, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 503 (1998); Christine M. Rodriguez, Accommodating Linguistic
Difference: Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Language Rights in the United States, 36 HARV. C.R-
C.L. L. REv. 133 (2001). Also consider the Voting Rights Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2004)
(requiring that bi- or multi-lingual ballots be provided in areas where there is a large population of
foreign language speakers).
182 See Southworth, supra note 144, at 223.
183 See id. at 225-30.
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area. 184 Moreover, one can envision situations arising where members of
the immigrant community may not want to involve themselves directly in a
potential conflict that may harm their image or reputation among the gen-
eral population. In these situations, their preference might be to have some-
one represent their interests and negotiate on their behalf. Here, the lawyer
can step into the role of a loyal advocate, sensitive to the pressures that her
clients face. 185 By serving as a transactional representative, the lawyer can
fulfill a social and political function within the wider community.
And it is this last point that needs reiteration. As we have discussed,
the fact is many lawyers are successful in championing a movement's
cause, because they coordinate traditional legal strategies with other politi-
cal and social tactics. Recent reports on the wave of Haitian demonstrations
in Miami over perceived biases in U.S. immigration policies suggest that
the leaders from this community-again many of whom are lawyers-have
sought to augment their pursuit of litigation with more grassroots tactics.1
6
Although they have been doing so for a much longer period of time, Cu-
ban-Americans in Miami also have been employing legal and non-legal
strategies together in a systematic manner in order to raise their political,
economic, and legal status.187 Because effective legal mobilization relies on
a combination of legal and political strategies, lawyers can speak to a wider
audience when representing an emerging immigrant community that may
be seeking to build coalition partners in the future. 188
The multi-faceted work lawyers perform also can be contagious.
Other, not yet well-organized communities may draw inspiration from ac-
tivities they see being conducted. Historical accounts of the 1960's civil
rights movement show how the work of legal advocates in the south partly
helped to spawn political action in northern cities,' 89 such as in Detroit,
Milwaukee, and Cleveland. More recently, consider the tactics used by
184 Id.
185 Id. at 224.
186 See Andrea Elliott et al., Haitians Detained at Sea Being Returned: Activists Say They Deserve
Hearings, THE MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 5, 2002, available at
http://www.miami.com/mld/mianiherald/news/local/4444122.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2004). See also
Frances Kerry, Florida Governor Faces Protests on Haitian Migrants, REUTERS, Oct. 30, 2002.
187 See RUDOLPHO 0. DE LA GARZA, LATINO VOICES: MEXICAN, PUERTO RICAN, AND CUBAN
PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN POLITICS (1992); MARIA DE LOS ANGELES TORRES, IN THE LAND OF
MIRRORS: CUBAN EXILE POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES (1999).
188 See McCann & Silverstein, supra note 6, at 272.
189 See generally DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
(1991); JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN COURT: How A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT
FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1994); HENRY HAMPTON & STEVE FRYAR, VOICES OF FREEDOM
(1991); DIANE MCWHORTER, CARRY ME HOME: BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA-THE CLIMACTIC BATTLE
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT; ROSENBERG, supra note 9; KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & MARK S.
BONCHECK, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS (1997).
[VOL. 11:4
MOBILIZING IMMIGRANTS
legal advocates of the Caribbean community in New York City. As a way
of protesting the City Police Department's shooting of immigrant Amadou
Diallo and torturing of immigrant Abner Louima, lawyers employed both
grassroots demonstrations and litigation that resulted in spurring political
action not just in New York but also in cities throughout the country. 190
Although assessing the precise impact of this influence needs empirical
verification, it appears that the actions of these activists in Manhattan em-
boldened leaders in other communities to speak out. Because the New York
entrepreneurs operationalized their tactical portfolio in a multi-dimensional
manner, they seem to have served as inspiration for movements that had not
yet materialized. To quote Michael McCann and Helen Silverstein:
When legal action is combined with other strategies, there is little reason to believe that...
lawyers contribute to the fragmentation of social movements. [Those] who approach legal
action in a strategic and politically savvy fashion often can significantly reduce the atomiz-
ing character of formal legal action .... [When these individuals] come to view themselves
more broadly as movement activists, this too can diminish the tendencies towards particular-
istic, internally divisive or disaggregating action.' 9'
Finally, lawyers can be useful to permanent resident communities be-
cause they know how to challenge the existing legal system, discursively. 92
Those who criticize the idea of having lawyers as leaders of social move-
ments tend to believe that such elites are too susceptible of falling under the
spell of the current legal order. 193 These critics worry that legal advocates
become caught up in the discourse and ideology of the prevailing legal sys-
tem and thereby have no ability or desire to contest the governing norms. 194
As a result, an emerging social movement, such as one that is immigrant-
based, may be unable to make substantive legal and political changes if
their leaders lack the wherewithal to stand up against those rules with
which they are most familiar and comfortable.
Yet, it is exactly because lawyers are familiar with the prevailing order
that they are best able to challenge the status quo. Because lawyers know
how the system operates, they also know how to speak the language of
those working within the system. They thus can identify both the strengths
190 See, e.g., Lisa Aubrey, In Salute of Hero Amadou Diallo (1977-1999), TOGUNA (winter 2001),
available at http://www.ohiou.edu/toguna/articles/winter2001/lisa-aubrey.htm (last visited Apr. 18,
2004); Betty Ann Bowser, After the Verdict, PBS NEWSHOUR, March 3, 2000, available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/jan-juneOO/diallo_3-3.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2004); ANNUAL
REPORT 1998: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, available at
http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar98/amr5l .htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2004).
191 McCann & Silverstein, supra note 6, at 272.
192 Id. at 273. See also PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN SILBEY, THE COMMONPLACE OF LAW (1998).
193 For a discussion of scholars who make these critiques, see supra Section W.A.
194 Id.
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and weaknesses within the judicial process.' 95 Lawyers can have the benefit
of being "insiders," and consequently they can (and do) effectively chal-
lenge the present legal order from within the system. 196 They can craft crea-
tive legal arguments and manipulate the existing legal framework to pro-
mote the causes that they represent. 197
Highlighting this point is the work, once again, of Susan Coutin.
Coutin describes how immigration lawyers, in their meetings with non-
citizen communities, would chastise the U.S. legal system and the immigra-
tion judges as "biased" and lacking "impartiality."'' 98 These immigration
lawyers characterized the INS as being primarily concerned with disposing
of cases in as quick a fashion as possible. 99 The lawyers would repeatedly
claim that it is easier for the government to presume that the non-citizen
should be deported, than to find exceptions within the law that might allow
him or her to stay.2"' Because of who they were and the credentials they
held, these immigration lawyers had a presumed air of legitimacy. When
they would cast the immigrants' battle with the legal system in terms of a
"war" that would require the immigrant to do whatever it took to win, the
advice from these advocates would be taken as gospel.201 The immigrants
keenly listened as their lawyers recommended that during any INS proceed-
ing, applicants would be best served if they could convince the government
that they spoke English, dressed "American," celebrated U.S. holidays,
valued American education, participated in traditional "American" social
organizations, and overall, belonged within mainstream American cul-
ture.2 °2 Thus, rather than reifying the status quo, these immigration lawyers
used their expertise and intimate knowledge of the system to articulate to
their constituents how best to help their own cause.20 3
195 See Stuart A. Scheingold, Radical Lawyers and Socialist Ideals, 15 J.L. Soc'Y 122 (1988).
196 See Ronen Shamir, Litigation as Consummatory Action: The Instrumental Paradigm Reconsid-
ered, 11 STUD. L. POL. SOC'Y 41 (1991).
197 For an eloquent discussion of this point, see Austin Sarat, ... The Law is All Over': Power,
Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. HuMAN. 343 (1990). See also
Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 353 (1996).
198 Coutin, supra note 165, at 129.
199 Id. at 131.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 130. For a classic account that made a similar point many years back, see Stephen Wex-
ler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049 (1970).
202 Id. For a different, albeit related, account, see Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Reg-
nant Lawyering, and Street-Level Bureaucracy, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 947 (1992).
203 Id. at 131. See also MCCANN, RIGHTS, supra note 6; McCann & Silverstein, supra note 6, at
274; Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 UNIV.
PITTS. L. REV. 723 (1991); Stephen Wizner, Homelessness: Advocacy and Social Policy, 45 UNIV. OF
MIAMI L. REV. 387 (1990-91).
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Of course, the use of discourse for the limited, instrumental purposes
described by Coutin may not seem all that surprising; lawyers regularly
advise clients how to behave depending upon the given context. But as she
and different scholars contend, employing discourse can be done for other
reasons as well. For example, Michael McCann describes how lawyers of-
ten through the use of legal discourse and rights-talk help crystallize a
group of people's aspirations. 2 4 Whether they draw on precise rights-based
language located in statutes or in court decisions, or whether they point to
the more abstract notions of justice itself, lawyers can espouse important
virtues that in turn motivate people to pursue particular political goals or
legal ideals.2 5 The language used by lawyers can guide the trajectory of a
people's ambitions and affect how, and to what degree, political mobiliza-
tion occurs.206 Stuart Scheingold has written as well that lawyers have the
ability to use the law to help redistribute power in society. 2 7 According to
Scheingold, the most effective movement lawyers are those who do not
become caught up in the "myth of rights. 20 8 These individuals realize that
a right provided by the legislature or judiciary does not automatically result
in the realization of that right.2 9 Needed as well are leaders skilled in the
politicization of rights. "Have-nots, 210 under the proper leadership, may be
motivated to seize upon a right and employ strategies to ensure that it be-
comes a reality.21I The movement lawyer is thus important because she can
galvanize constituents to participate in politics, 21 2 and because she can rec-
204 MCCANN, RIGHTS, supra note 6; McCann & Silverstein, supra note 6. Also, Bert Kritzer's
work on the different types of activities in which lawyers engage is especially relevant. See, e.g.,
HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER (1991); Herbert M. Kritzer & Jayanth K. Krishnan, Law-
yers Seeking Clients: Clients Seeking Lawyers, 21 J.L. & POL'Y 347-75 (1999); Herbert M. Kritzer,
Propensity to Sue in England and the United States: Blaming and Claiming in Tort Cases, 18 J.L.
SOC'Y 400 (1991); Herbert M. Kritzer, Fee Arrangements and Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 125 (1984); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Fracturing Legal Profession: The Case of Plaintiffs' Per-
sonal Injury Lawyers INT'L. J. LEGAL PROF. (forthcoming 2004).
205 See Michael McCann, Causal versus Constitutive Explanations (or, On the Difficulty of Being
so Positive.. .), 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 457 (1996).
206 For an overview and subsequent critique of this point, see MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS
TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991), who, in fact, has chided those move-
ments that have leaders that focus on "rights-talk." In her view, such language limits (rather than ex-
pands) the possibilities for members within these groups. Id. Unfortunately, Glendon's evidence for this
assertion is weak. As the literature I draw on in this section and the next will illustrate, she glosses over
the fact that legal entrepreneurs can be multi-dimensional.
207 SCHEINGOLD, supra note 9, at 151-203.
208 Id. at 13-82.
209 Id.
210 See Marc Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974).
211 SCHEINGOLD, supra note 9, at 83-150.
212 See, e.g., Richard Abel, Speaking Law to Power: Occasions for Cause Lawyering, in CAUSE
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ognize that rights on paper, at best, serve only as a catalyst for mobilizing
communities that need to have their voices heard.
In sum, it is probably true that permanent residents will not be receiv-
ing the right to vote anytime soon. Obviously if this remains the case, there
will be little opportunity for lawyers to work on bringing permanent resi-
dents to the ballot box. But even if permanent residents never gain the right
to vote, the fact is that lawyers can still play a vital role in mobilizing these
immigrants. Through their use and knowledge of rights discourse, lawyers
can inspire, educate, and publicize the causes of permanent residents to
society at large. And lawyers can also be involved in various non-litigation
oriented strategies, including formal political lobbying, coalition-building,
transactional work, and grassroots tactics. Therefore, contrary to how de-
tractors often characterize them, lawyers can be very useful in whether
permanent resident communities are politicized.
IV. PUBLIC POLICIES IMPACTING LAWYERS WORKING ON BEHALF
IMMIGRANTS-CONCLUDING REMARKS
The above discussion on the role of lawyers working with permanent
resident communities has been two-fold. I first presented the many ways in
which lawyers might be able to assist permanent residents, were these im-
migrants given the right to vote. Assuming, however, full suffrage rights-
equivalent to those held by citizens-were not granted, I then suggested
that lawyers could still have an important impact on politically mobilizing
these non-enfranchised individuals. Yet, the one question that remains is,
under what conditions would lawyers even be inclined to engage in such
public interest service on behalf of immigrant communities? What role, if
any, has the government played in encouraging lawyers to devote their time
and energy to helping these non-citizens?
In his passionate essay describing the recent "assault on progressive
public interest lawyers, 213 Professor David Luban argues that the federal
government and the courts have engaged in "a disturbing pattern of legal
attacks on public-interest lawyers . . . , targeting every one of the principal
sources of support for progressive public-interest law: the Legal Services
Corporation ("LSC"), state Interest on Lawyers Trust Account ("IOLTA")
LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 118-150 (Austin Sarat
& Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 1998).
213 David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public Interest Lawyers,
91 CAL. L. REv. 209 (2003).
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programs, law school clinics, and civil rights attorneys' fees. 214 In terms
first of the LSC, this entity emerged in 1974 after Congress passed the Le-
gal Services Corporations Act.215 The mission of the LSC has been "to
promote equal access to the system of justice and improve opportunities for
low-income people throughout the United States by making grants for the
provision of high-quality civil legal assistance to those who would be oth-
erwise unable to afford legal counsel. 216
In order to accomplish this goal, the LSC-grants are awarded "to inde-
pendent local programs selected through a system of competition. In 2002,
LSC funded 179 local programs, 217 totaling $310,000,000.218
Yet, for lawyers who have wanted to use their diverse skills to assist
immigrants, the LSC has restricted much of what they can do. 219 For ex-
ample, because LSC guidelines prohibit class action lawsuits, 220 an LSC-
funded lawyer cannot represent immigrants who might wish jointly to bring
a cause of action in court. Moreover, since LSC-funded lawyers are barred
from representing individuals in criminal matters, 221 this precludes them
from defending immigrants who, in this post 9-11 era, are more open than
ever to arbitrary prosecution. Furthermore, in 1996, Congress added a new
set of amendments to the Act which now prohibits LSC recipients from
engaging in "rulemaking, lobbying ... and [even specifically the] represen-
tation of certain categories of aliens"222 (italics added). Professor Luban
notes:
214 Id. at 209-10.
215 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2000).
216 LSC Mission Statement, Legal Services Corporation website, at
http://www.lsc.gov/welcome/welwhat.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2004).
217 What is LSC?, Legal Services Corporation website, at
http://www.lsc.gov/welcome/welwho.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2004) [hereinafter What is LSC?].
218 LSC BUDGET: FY02 APPROPRIATION, at http://www.lsc.gov/pressr/pr_02a.htm (last visited
Apr. 18, 2004). Although encouraging lawyers to provide legal services to the needy has been long
promoted in the United States, the immediate federal predecessor to the LSC was the Legal Services
Program, created within the Office of Economic Opportunity in 1966 as part of President Lyndon John-
son's War on Poverty. Members of Congress who opposed the Legal Services Program sought its elimi-
nation almost immediately, but supporters, with the help of President Nixon, staved off these efforts in a
compromise that established the politically independent LSC in 1974. For a brief history of legal ser-
vices in the U.S., see MidPenn Legal Services, at http://midpenn.org/aboutus.htmi (last visited Apr. 18,
2004). See also SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES (1999).
219 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(8)-(10) (2000). See also Luban, supra note 213, at 221.
220 § 2996e(d)(5); also see Luban, supra note 213, at 221 (noting that under the Legal Services
Corporations Act, recipients of LSC money also may not litigate cases involving abortion, secondary
school desegregation, and most military matters). For an important discussion on the potential pitfalls of
class action suits, see Deborah Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982).
221 See What is LSC?, supra note 217. See also Luban, supra note 213, at 221.
222 The primary category of aliens referred to here is undocumented workers. See What is LSC?,
supra note 217. See also Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 (1996
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Perhaps the most devastating regulation, however, is Congress's prohibition on LSC recipi-
ents using their nonfederal funds for these prohibited activities. This requirement had a dras-
tic effect. A legal-aid office could no longer accept an LSC grant if it did any prohibited le-
gal work. This provision forced legal-services providers to split into separate organizations
with separate offices, one receiving federal funds and abiding by the restrictions, the other
maintaining its freedom of action at the cost of its LSC grant. LSC enacted "program integ-
rity" regulations to implement this restriction by ensuring that the two offspring organiza-
tions maintained physical and financial separation. The result was bifurcated organizations
substantially weaker than the initial organization. Some organizations had to purchase dupli-
cate computer systems and hire duplicate staff. Some locales could afford only a restricted
office, so that clients with the "wrong" cases were forced to travel hundreds of miles to find
counsel or, more realistically, do without.223
In my home state of Minnesota, one needs only to examine the two
main legal aid offices to see how immigrant representation has been af-
fected by the bifurcation to which Luban refers. The Central Minnesota
Legal Services ("CMLS") office receives all of its funding from the LSC.224
Its work is restricted to legal initiatives involving family law, housing, gov-
ernment services, and consumer law.225 As its website indicates, CMLS'
tactics are narrowly tailored to assist "eligible clients through direct repre-
Act), §504, 110 Stat. 1321-53; Luban, supra note 213, at 221.
223 Luban, supra note 213, at 221-22. It should be noted that in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,
531 U.S. 533 (2001), the Supreme Court ruled that lawyers receiving LSC funding could not be re-
stricted in representing clients who sought to challenge existing social welfare laws. The Court ruled
that the LSC restriction was unconstitutional, but as Luban argues, this holding is very limited, and
leaves in place the remaining aspects of the 1996 amendments to the Legal Services Corporation Act.
See Luban, supra note 213, at 226-227 (noting that especially in comparison to Legal Aid Soc 'y v. Legal
Servs. Corp., 145 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 1998)-a broad Ninth Circuit judgment holding that the Act
survives scrutiny under an Equal Protection analysis - Velazquez is substantively quite narrow). For
more discussion on the Velazquez case, see: Carrie S. Berstein, Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez: The
Supreme Court's Missed Opportunity to Clarify the Framework for Examining the Constitutionality of
Government Program Restrictions, 79 DENV. U. L. REv. 137 (2001); Shirley N. K. Garcia, Legal Ser-
vices Corp. v. Velazquez: A Correct Application of the U.S. Supreme Court's First Amendment Limited
Public Reform Analysis, 24 U. HAW. L. REv. 331 (2001); Christopher Gozdor, Legal Services Corp. v.
Velazquez: A Problematic Commingling of Unconstitutional Conditions and Public Fora Analysis
Yields a New Grey Area in Free Speech, 61 MD. L. REv. 454 (2002); Christian Hammond, The Supreme
Court's Decision in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez and the Analysis Under the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 157 (2001); Jeffrey Van Hooreweghe, Legal Services Corp.
v. Velazquez: The Supreme Court's Missed Opportunity to Clarify the Viewpoint Discrimination Doc-
trine 's Role in Subsidized Speech Cases, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 539 (2001); Jay C. Johnson, The Interac-
tion between Statutory and Constitutional Arguments: Legal Services Corp., v. Velazquez 17 J.L. &
POL. 353 (2001).
224 See Funding Sources, Central Minnesota Legal Services (CMLS), at
http://www.centralmnlegal.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2004).
225 Id.
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sentation, brief advice, and through participating in community legal educa-
tion programs. 2 2
6
In contrast, the Mid-Minnesota Legal Assistance ("MMLA") office
does not receive any money from LSC. MMLA's resources, which are con-
sidered more extensive than other non-LSC offices, come from different
local, state, and federal agencies, private donors, and independent founda-
22tions. 27 MMLA is not restricted by LSC guidelines in how it seeks to ac-
complish its mission. In addition to legal representation, the group engages
in a range of community building activities and educational awareness pro-
grams.228 MMLA also has occasionally assisted immigrants; for example a
few years back the group brokered an agreement with the state Department
of Human Services that guaranteed better access to social welfare programs
for individuals with limited English skills.229 But while the MMLA lawyers
have worked on immigration cases, they devote particular attention to what
are called "special projects" (e.g., projects involving disability law, elder
law, housing law, and agricultural law); immigration law does not fall un-
der this category.230 There are no doubt valid reasons for this exclusion;
donor wishes, lawyer expertise, client demand, and the like may explain
why immigration law is not as emphasized as much as other areas of the
law. Yet one does wonder whether this bifurcated LSC-system invariably
strips certain people (such as non-citizens) of the opportunity to have their
important needs met.
Professor Luban identifies other political and legal factors impeding
the development of public interest lawyering. For example, interest on law-
yers trust account programs (IOLTA), which are state plans that were set up
after 1980 to help fund low-income legal services, have recently come un-
der attack.23' Although by a 5-4 vote the Supreme Court recently in Brown
226 Id.
227 See Mid-Minnesota Legal Assistance (MMLA), at http://www.midnnlegal.org (last visited
Apr. 18, 2004).
228 Id.
229 See Yang v. O'Keefe, Civ. Action 99-2033, D.C. Minn. 4th Div. (December 2000). For a dis-
cussion of this settlement see Cultural Competence in the Delivery of Services Through Medicaid Man-
aged Care, § 102, at http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/newsps/ccs/part .html.
230 For a list and discussion of these special projects, see MMLA's website at
http://www.midmnlegal.org.
231 As Luban explains, under the Restatement as well as under the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, lawyers are ordered to keep funds that they hold for clients in a separate trust account.
Luban, supra note 213, at 226-27. Significant amounts of money held for a longer duration are placed in
interest-bearing accounts; smaller amounts of money or those held for shorter periods are placed in
demand accounts. Id. Clients are entitled to the interest earned on these funds (particularly with respect
to the interest-bearing accounts), but in certain cases, the administrative costs associated with transfer-
ring the interest back to the client are more than the interest itself (as in with demand accounts). Id at
227. Recognizing this, states enacted programs after 1980, when the federal banking laws changed, that
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v. Legal Foundation of Washington upheld the constitutionality of IOLTA
programs, given the closeness of the vote and a 1998 Court ruling that put
the IOLTA scheme in jeopardy, some observers still remain cautious about
how long the program will remain intact.232 Also, clinical legal programs at
several state law schools throughout the country, which often represent
immigrants, have unfortunately been the victims of budget cuts and recent
regulations limiting who can work within these centers.233 And, over the
past two decades the Supreme Court has reduced the opportunities for pub-
lic interest lawyers to collect attorneys' fees in cases where federal statutes
would seem to authorize such payments from defeated parties.234 All of
these institutional obstacles have impaired lawyers from emerging as effec-
tive leaders within various needing communities. Of course, not all immi-
grants are incapable of affording legal services-but there are those who do
struggle economically. If financially disadvantaged immigrants, in particu-
lar, wish to reap the benefits of having lawyers assist them with their
causes, strategies must be developed to overturn these institutional road-
blocks.2 35
would use the interest from demand accounts (interest that would not anyway go back to the client) to
fund legal services for the poor. Id. Luban reports that in 2001, these IOLTA programs generated $125
million dollars. Id. But opponents to IOLTA charge that this is an unconstitutional taking on the part of
the state, and that because nearly half of the states in the country require lawyers to participate in an
IOLTA program, the states are forcing lawyers to engage in coercive speech. Id. at 234.
232 Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003). The 1998 ruling by the Court
held that clients who have funds in these demand accounts (see previous footnote) are entitled to this
interest. See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998). For a discussion of this point, see
Luban, supra note 213, at 228.
233 See Luban, supra note 213, at 236-40. For another interesting account of the role social action
litigation can play within the law school environment, see ROBERT V. STOVER, MAKING IT AND
BREAKING IT: THE FATE OF PUBLIC INTEREST COMMITMENT DURING LAW SCHOOL (1989).
234 See Luban, supra note 213, at 241-45. Luban cites several of these cases, including: Farrar v.
Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992); City of Burlington v. Dague, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992); Memphis Cmty. Sch.
Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986); Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985); and Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247 (1978). Arguably, the two most famous cases are Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va.
Dep't of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) and Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986). For a
set of writings that have analyzed the Buckhannon case, in particular, see: Paolo G. Annino, The Buck-
hannon Decision: An End to the Catalyst Theory and a Setback to Civil Rights, 26 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 11 (2002); David Arkush, Preserving "Catalyst" Attorneys' Fees Under
the Freedom of Information Act in the Wake of Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources, 37 HARV. C.L-C.R. L. REV. 131 (2002); Caroline L.
Curry, Recent Developments Attorney's Fees- 'Prevailing Party' and Rejection of the "Catalyst Theory
Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 54
ARK. L. REV. 727 (2001); and Marisa L. Ugalde, The Future of Environmental Citizen Suits After
Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Services, 8
ENVTL. L. 589 (2002).
235 For an important work discussing possible ways to maintain public interest lawyering on behalf
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In the post 9-1 1 era, immigrant rights have taken a serious hit from
politicians, judges, and law enforcement officials. Given that the political
climate is unlikely to change anytime in the near future, the proposal made
years ago that lawful permanent residents should have a voice in the elec-
toral process has regained momentum among many immigrant-rights activ-
ists. I, too, believe that enfranchising this group is long overdue. However,
as part of a community that is striving to protect the interests of what John
Hart Ely has called one of our nation's most disempowered class of indi-
viduals,236 I have also suggested that it is equally important for lawyers to
work at the grassroots level on behalf of immigrants to ensure that true po-
litical, legal, and socio-economic change is made. Until such bottom-up
mobilization emerges on a wider scale, those of us interested in this issue
should hold our breath hoping that more abuses against immigrants do not
materialize.
of the needy, see Charles Ogletree, Beyond Justification: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defend-
ers, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1239 (1993).
236 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 149-62 (1980).
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